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Abstract 
One of the contemporary trends marking our current moment in theory is the call for the 
elaboration of ‘new’ materialisms. The new materialisms, however, have taken two principal 
articulations: a Neo-Spinozist materialism read through the work of Gilles Deleuze, 
represented by thinkers such as Elizabeth Grosz, Jane Bennett and William Connolly and a 
Neo-Hegelian materialism read through Jacques Lacan, represented by figures Alain Badiou, 
Slavoj Žižek and Adrian Johnston. Concomitant with this return of materialism has been a 
resurgence in the topic of habit as a topic worthy of philosophical investigation. There is, 
however a division in the treatment of habit between the two camps. Habit is deemed positive 
by the vitalist materialisms influenced by Spinoza and Deleuze – illustrating the self’s 
continuity and openness to the outside – but neglected by the Neo-Hegelian materialisms of 
Badiou, Žižek and Johnston as an instance of the political quietism of the ‘micropolitical’. 
Contemporary French philosopher Catherine Malabou, typically associated with the figures 
of the Neo-Hegelian camp, elaborates a different materialism based on the principle of 
plasticity developed through not Hegel and Lacan, but Hegel and Heidegger and thus sits 
liminally between the two dominant materialist orientations. This thesis will elaborate 
Malabou’s ontology of plasticity and argue how a reading of habit through Malabou’s plastic 
rapprochement of Hegel-Heidegger offers a different perspective on habit as a critical ethico-
political modality that can helpfully negotiate some of the binaries or impasses that mark 
contemporary ongoing debates in the interrelated fields of ontology and political theory 
Keywords 
Catherine Malabou, plasticity, habit, materialism, ontology, Hegel, Heidegger, subjectivity, 
politics, affect 
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Introduction 
One of the contemporary trends marking our current moment in theory is the call for the 
elaboration of ‘new’ materialisms. If Edmund Husserl’s famous dictate was a return to things 
themselves, the mid to late twentieth in France a return to language itself, the call to return to 
culture itself in the eighties and nineties in North America, the present moment is punctuated 
by exhortations to return to the world or matter itself. This turn is precipitated by a uniformly 
admitted exhaustion with previously existing dominant textually and culturally oriented 
theoretical practices that failed to, as proponents of these new paradigms suggest, sufficiently 
attend to the agency or independence of materiality itself. It is also arguably occasioned by 
the slow-setting melancholia of processing the various deaths we have witnessed in the past 
century: the death of God, the death of the Subject, the death of Metanarratives, the death of 
Communism. The return to materialism occurring today may be an indication of our actual 
acceptance, registering and working through how to adequately conceptualize existence in an 
immanent real bereft of transcendent certainty.  
The twofold difficulty that accompanies such a characterization is, however, the rather 
conflicting array of claimants propounding their own specific variety of ‘materialism’ and, 
attendently, the consequent indeterminacy of what is actually announced under the 
invocation of ‘materialism’ in the clamor of so many contesting voices. In surveying 
contemporary critical literature, however, discernible co-ordinates for marking out discrete 
trajectories in this conflicted milieu of new materialism are emerging, evincing ultimately 
two principal orientations that Adrian Johnston helpfully characterizes as an “infra-
materialist antagonistic division” between Neo-Hegelianism and Neo-Spinozism or the axes 
of Hegel-Lacan and Spinoza-Deleuze (“Interview with Adrian Johnston on Transcendental 
Materialism”). The former, the contemporary Hegelian camp, proffer a materialism 
predicated on a commitment to materialist accounts of the subject via a reactualization of 
German Idealism, primarily G.W.F. Hegel, through the psychoanalytical framework of 
Jacques Lacan, the macropolitical ambitions of Karl Marx and engagements with the 
sciences as represented by figures such as Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek and Adrian Johnston. 
The latter, contemporary Deleuzo-Spinozists, pursue avowedly posthumanist materialisms 
premised on the rejection of the subject through a solicitation to attend to an agentive and re-
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enchanted substance and ignored the vital materiality of life – of which the human is just one 
part – eschewing macropolitical ambitions in favour of micropolitical initiatives via a 
syncretic retrieval of thinkers such as Baruch Spinoza, Henri Bergson and Friedrich 
Nietzsche as read through the work of Gilles Deleuze, as well as Michel Foucault, in tandem 
with developments in the natural sciences as represented by figures such as Elizabeth Grosz, 
Jane Bennett and William Connolly.  
Concomitant with this return of materialism has been a resurfacing of the topic of habit. With 
the recent publication of the first substantial anthology dedicated solely to the concept, 
entitled A History of Habit: From Bourdieu to Aristotle (2013), along with a special issue of 
journal Body and Society (2013) devoted specifically to exploring habit, there are signs of a 
recent resurgence of interest in habit as a topic worthy of philosophical exploration in 
contemporary continental philosophy. To say that there has been a lack of interest in thinking 
about habit would be misrepresentative given that various fields such as psychology and 
importantly for today, advertising, as well as a host of other empirical disciplines such as 
sociology, biology, zoology, neurology, have long been engaged in researching the 
phenomenon of habit in the constitution, production and maintenance of both organic and 
inorganic entities and processes. However, the return of habit as a concept of philosophical 
importance in the realm of continental theory marks a decisive break in a kind of sclerosis 
concerning how the notion has been principally configured and treated within this 
philosophical discourse, exhibiting a renewed sensibility that something may be both 
ontologically and politically at stake in how we codify, construct and hold ourselves in 
relation to the idea of what habit actually is and means in our social and intellectual 
imaginary.  
The current futures of both habit and materialism are thus, presently, open, in a process of 
de-sedimentation and re-sedimentation, and as such, sites of contestation over precisely what 
these concepts mean or entail. What is striking, however, is the discernible congruity 
between how the two concepts are being genealogically constructed and coded within 
emerging contemporary theory. In fact, what evinces itself is that both habit and materialism 
are cut down the middle in a homologous fashion by contemporary theorists into two 
traditions marked by the same theoretical demarcations and trajectories. Habit is divided into 
two traditions which Elizabeth Grosz nicely summates: there is a “wayward tradition” of a 
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“philosophy of life that runs through the work of Felix Ravaisson, Henri Bergson and Gilles 
Deleuze”, a lineage that, Grosz writes, “if stretched backward, would also have to include 
Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume and others” 
[where] habit is regarded not as that which reduces the human to the order of the mechanical, 
as in the works of, for example, Descartes, Kant and Sartre, but rather as a fundamentally 
creative capacity that produces the possibility of stability in a universe in which change is 
fundamental (219, 233)  
Here, then, we can align Grosz’s organizing gesture1 with the two materialist orientations 
which Johnston characterized as Neo-Spinozist and Neo-Hegelian: on the one side, there are 
the thinkers of substance – Bergson, Deleuze, Spinoza – who construe habit positively as an 
ineluctable part of life, and on the other there are the thinkers of subject – Descartes, Kant 
and Sartre – who see habit as something which must be overcome as it limits the autonomy 
of the self. While Grosz is essentially correct in her taxonomy, her characterization of the 
way these two traditions of thought relate to habit requires some qualification. The Neo-
Spinozists positively construe habit at the ontological level because it demonstrates a 
continuity of the human with its material environs; but habit indicates a passivity that 
undermines the notion of autonomy that undergirds the classical subject. That is, habit is 
affirmed because it “grounds us in a firmly pre-representational real, a real made up of forces 
that stimulate and transform living beings” (Grosz 218), meaning, it demonstrates that the 
subject is not its own ground, but rather that something precedes us that permits us to exist: 
the passive ontological contraction of habits, at the level of the material body. However, what 
Grosz occludes is while ontological habit is recognized positively, those following Deleuze’s 
Neo-Spinozism do not affirm habits at the socio-political or normative level, but precisely 
seek to escape or break them. That is, in terms of worldly actuality in the form of socio-
political mores, values or forms of organization, habit is a mode of arborescence, a 
                                                 
1
 This is a gesture repeated by both Clare Carlisle in “The Question of Habit in Theology and Philosophy” and 
Simon Lumsden in “Habit and the Limits of the Autonomous Self”. Carlisle connects the negative conception 
of habit with Descartes, Kant, Kierkegaard and Sartre (31, 49) and the positive appraisal with Ravaisson, Paul 
Ricoeur, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the new vitalism of Bergson and Deleuze, and in the American pragmatism of 
William James and John Dewey (49-50). Lumsden corroborates this genealogy of Deleuze, Bergson and 
Ravaisson (63).  
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mechanism of territorialization that captures the virtual fluxes, intensities and affects of 
becoming. The Neo-Spinozist thus politically prescribes the micropolitical practice of 
pursuing ‘lines of flight’ that elude the re-territorializations of habit in the form of the 
dominant socio-political world. They seek to enjoy ‘brief habits’ but never substantively re-
instantiate new habits at the level of the socio-political because the objective world – or the 
State, in Deleuze – is an a priori mechanism of capture – it is only something to be fled. The 
other tradition identified, represented by a line of Descartes, Kant and Sartre, leads to the 
present Neo-Hegelian materialisms of Badiou, Žižek and Johnston, who do defend the 
subject and thus construe habits in their normative, socio-political sense to be a detriment to 
the individual if one merely passively acquiesces to one’s given situation. They agree that 
habits of organizing and thinking about being-in-the-world – such as the hegemony of 
contemporary late capitalism – are apparatuses of capture that can thwart the freedom and 
well-being of individuals. However, following the dialectical materialism of Marx, they posit 
that the habits of the socio-political world can be transformed if they do not contribute to the 
flourishing of human well-being; but they eschew the micropolitical prescriptions of habit 
formation in favour of advocating large-scale structural change as they construe the 
micropolitics of habit to be merely an instance of insular, pseudo-subversion that leads to 
political quietism instead of actual societal transformation.  
The thought of Catherine Malabou, however, troubles this bifurcated organization. Malabou 
is frequently grouped along with the Neo-Hegelianisms of Žižek and Johnston, and, while 
her thinking is certainly congenial to their respective projects given the centrality of Hegel to 
her own intellectual itinerary, it is not strictly coincident with them, diverging in important 
respects. Particularly, Malabou is distinguished from other these contemporary Hegelianisms 
in regard to the significance of a micropolitics of habit to the intelligibility of the socio-
political implications of her project. Žižek and Johnston strictly disavow the political efficacy 
of micropolitical habits associated with figures like Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault – 
which they construe as insular, complicit reformism - eschewing them in favour of ‘thinking 
big’ as Johnston puts it, advocating “revolutionary macropolitics” (158). However, 
Malabou’s own new materialism grounded in an ontology of plasticity shows that a Hegelian 
and Heideggerian informed micropolitics of habit is not only possible, but arguably 
necessary to adequately conceptualize and possibly enact socio-political change. 
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This thesis will then elaborate Malabou’s new materialism of a plasticity of being qua being 
and demonstrate how habit plays a pivotal role in making the emancipatory nature of 
plasticity that Malabou envisages actualized and effectual. I argue that plasticity is strictly an 
ontological principle that simply means, following Malabou, Being’s ability to receive, give 
and annihilate form. As such, what Malabou’s materialist vision of plasticity amounts to is a 
demonstration of the nature of Being as the ability to change: Being, as such, is merely 
material possibility. This materialist vision of plasticity prohibits any claims to transcendent 
necessity as there is nothing outside of the immanence of matter or Being, meaning that 
nothing needs to be the way it is. While plasticity thus provides an ontological check to any 
ideologically naturalizing socio-political formations – such as contemporary late capitalism – 
it provides only that: the promissory knowledge that things can be different. To actualize 
plasticity, meaning, how we can put plasticity to work, is through the operation of habit 
which Malabou calls the “instrument” of plasticity. Habit is the means by which we sculpt 
the marble of existence that is plasticity, shaping ourselves and world through our own 
activity. As such, micropolitical practices become essential to achieving any kind of 
sustained new shape of life because, like the plasticity of the brain, new connections, new 
modes of organization only emerge with coordinated effort and practice. Through the 
analogy of sculpting the plasticity of one’s self and one’s world, Malabou demonstrates the 
shortcomings of the paradigmatic Neo-Spinozist and Neo-Hegelian modes of thinking socio-
political change: minor and un-coordinated de-territorializations do not sufficiently make a 
new contour in the marble of the world, and Evental ruptures do nothing but erase the old 
shapes without providing a determinate new form. To make a new form or create the shape 
of the world one would be at home with, one needs to sculpt concertedly with coordinated 
purpose until it becomes instantiated as a habit.  
The first chapter will comprise a sustained explication of Malabou’s new materialism 
grounded in plasticity. I argue that the critical reception of Catherine Malabou’s thought, 
particularly in the English-speaking world, has been over-determined by the inaccurate 
impression of her ‘signature’ concept of plasticity as being strictly localized to 
neuroplasticity. I will then explicate Malabou’s larger philosophical project of elaborating a 
plasticity of being qua being of which neuroplasticity is one expression or manifestation of. 
This will lead me to assert that what plasticity means is essentially the capacity of Being to 
 xi 
 
give, receive or annihilate form, which entails, ultimately, our possibility to transform 
ourselves or be otherwise. 
The second chapter will continue from this logical end of Malabou’s elaboration of 
ontological plasticity. I will argue that for Malabou’s concept of plasticity to have the 
emancipatory potential she envisages, plasticity, as purely ontological, requires a material 
instantiation or means of subjective actualization. Following this, I submit that such a 
requisite mode of putting plasticity to work is found in the concept of habit which is the 
‘instrument’ through which plasticity is sculpted. Pursuant to this, I will elaborate Malabou’s 
reading of Hegel’s account of habit in the Philosophy of Mind and supplement it in two ways. 
First, I will transpose the ontological-individual account of habit in Philosophy of Mind to the 
socio-political role of habit found in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, identifying a missed 
opportunity on Malabou’s part to substantiate her claims to the socio-political import of 
plasticity and habit. Secondly, I draw out the similarities between Hegel and Heidegger’s 
accounts of social habituation that Malabou fails to detect, ultimately strengthening 
Malabou’s attempted rapprochement between the two figures. In the end, I argue that reading 
habit through Malabou’s thinking of plasticity and her rapprochement between Hegel and 
Heidegger offers a different and productive perspective on habit as a critical ethico-political 
modality that can helpfully negotiate some of the binaries or impasses that mark 
contemporary ongoing debates in the interrelated fields of ontology and political theory.  
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Chapter 1  
1 Plasticity 
 
This chapter argues that the critical reception of Catherine Malabou’s thought, 
particularly in the English-speaking world, has been over-determined by the inaccurate 
impression of her ‘signature’ concept of plasticity as being strictly localized to 
neuroplasticity. The tendency of Malabou’s interlocutors in her critical reception to 
overemphasize this expression of plasticity risks effacing the more crucial philosophical 
bases of why Malabou needs plasticity itself; that is, plasticity here is treated as a 
beginning point rather than a result. It is my contention that the focus on Malabou’s 
engagement with neuroscience effectively obscures the trajectory of her project as one 
that is committed to elaborating a new materialism of immanence grounded in a general 
ontology of plasticity, that is, a plasticity of Being qua Being. I argue that Malabou 
develops plasticity in response to the need to render intelligible her vision of a wholly 
immanent, closed structure of Being without recourse to any transcendent(s), exteriority 
or outside. I will re-construct, identify and foreground the key elements that subtend the 
logic of Malabou’s philosophical program which make plasticity necessary and, as such, 
properly situate our understanding of plasticity as pertaining to both more general 
ontological and socio-political claims contra its strict localization to only neuroplasticity.  
Following Malabou’s argument for an ontology of plasticity to its logical end, what I 
argue is that plasticity, in and of itself, is purely an ontological principle that is neither 
inherently progressive nor normatively positive. Plasticity is without prescription or 
purpose; it is simply, in the end, the reception, donation or annihilation of form or matter: 
it is the indifferent stage of the world untethered from the gaze of a Big Other, the design 
of a God or any telos whatsoever. The world, our socio-political organizations and 
ourselves are merely densely imbricated finite materialities capable of processual 
composition and recomposition, whose direction, shape and contours are nothing but the 
product of our own intervention and construction: conscious and unconscious alike. As 
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such, plasticity is only the ontological argument for the pure possibility that defines Being 
and thus cannot positively direct or guide human activity but rather only provide a 
metaphysical resource to unsettle any claims to necessity (such as the realism that 
undergirds contemporary late capitalism). While significant in this epistemic respect, 
plasticity thus requires a commensurate theory of subjective action through which the 
knowledge of this ontological possibility of plasticity can become efficacious or 
actualized. This, I argue, is habit and will be treated in the second chapter of this thesis.   
This chapter will then proceed to outline Malabou’s core ontological project of 
elaborating a new materialism of immanence bereft of any transcendent(s), outside or 
exteriority by re-constructing the development of her theoretical trajectory which unfold 
in roughly two phases and domains: philosophical and scientific. Malabou’s work in The 
Future of Hegel and The Heidegger Change constitutes the securement of the strictly 
ontological basis of her materialism, comprising her philosophical articulation of 
plasticity staged through a rapprochement of Hegel and Heidegger which leads Malabou 
to ascertain plasticity as a general ontological principal of being qua being. The second 
major phase in the development of plasticity concerns Malabou’s turn to neuroscience 
where she tracks the expression of ontological plasticity in the work of neuroscience. 
This again takes form in the course of two separate but arguably conjoined works – WB 
and NW - that treat the two respective major valences of plasticity: constructive – the 
positive side of plasticity in the reception and donation of form – and destructive – the 
aleatory, indifferent nature of matter’s own plastic capacity to autodestruct or deform 
itself. Having firmly and clearly established the nature of Malabou’s ontological 
plasticity, we will then be in a place to proceed to habit which constitutes the site through 
which I will elaborate a materialist theory of subjectivity vis-à-vis reading habit as the 
instrument of human activity which sculpts plasticity. 
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1.1 Catherine Malabou Beyond Neuroplasticity 
 
Being is plasticity: the threefold capacity to receive, give or annihilate form. Such is the 
sole principle, the great insight and terminus of Malabou’s philosophy, one could and 
may be led to believe. A focus on plasticity marks all secondary engagements with 
Malabou’s works and, it should be said, not without reason – how could one possibly 
escape it? It is there in the beginning in her doctoral dissertation as ontological plasticity 
The Future of Hegel (1996/2005), in her engagements with the constructive plasticity in 
What Should We Do with Our Brain? (2005/2009), through her work on destructive 
plasticity in The New Wounded (2008/2012), in her intervention into feminist theory with 
gender plasticity in Changing Difference (2009/2012) and also in her most recent co-
publication with Adrian Johnston, Self and Emotional Life (2013). The ubiquity of 
plasticity in Malabou’s oeuvre has led some, such as Alexander Galloway2, to 
disapprovingly characterize plasticity as an “intellectual mannerism…to return again and 
again to plasticity as [a] universal explanation” (Galloway, “Catherine Malabou, or The 
Commerce of Being” 3), a simple catch-all deus ex machina, which, for Galloway, 
                                                 
2
 Galloway conducted a series of public lectures at the Public School in New York in 2010 which were 
published in a pamphlet under the title French Theory Today. In this lecture series, Galloway treats 
Malabou, Bernard Stiegler, Mehdi Belhaj Kacem, Quentin Meillassoux and Francois Laruelle, of whom he 
has selected as representative of new work occurring in French continental theory. His lecture on Malabou, 
of which I will respond to both here and briefly later in this chapter, comprises one of the only 
engagements by a semi-visible/notable American intellectual with her work, and as such, represents a 
disservice to Malabou’s thinking and to those exposed to her work for the first time through his explication. 
Galloway is derisive, snide and superficial in his treatment and reading of Malabou, demonstrating a total 
lack of any sophisticated study, attention or time paid to her work – it is an empty and hollow gesture that 
he even openly ‘considers’ her work. While the engagements with the other thinkers in the pamphlet series 
are primarily thoughtful, considerate and affirmative, Galloway’s engagement with Malabou should not 
even be called as such, being a collegiate, mud-slinging affair motivated by a barely covert Deleuzian 
partisanship that distorts his readings – which are in themselves violent and careless – closing off 
Malabou’s thinking in advance. This constitutes precisely an instance of violence in where Malabou is put 
under erasure because Galloway, showing his “true colours”, admits that he wonders “if there can ever be 
an appealing political project founded on the work of Hegel or Derrida” (13), never stopping to think or 
take the time to read, or entertain the possibility that she – Catherine Malabou – may not be isomorphic 
with them. One might think, may hope, that the name on the book cover – Catherine Malabou – may signal 
emphatically enough that she is not.  
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paradoxically ossifies plasticity, a principle of change, into a static, fixed universal: “…it 
[is] an irony that fuels [Malabou]: that to promote plasticity as a big, overarching concept 
– much like the role that Spirit plays in Hegel – is to contradict the meaning of plasticity 
as change…” (Galloway 8)3. Malabou’s plasticity, then, is a “voracious monster that can 
gobble up all foes into itself” (Galloway 15), that extols perpetual change as an ‘ethical’ 
end in itself (Galloway 13, 15), that resembles Hegel’s dialectic, and reflects the ruthless 
consumptive apparatus that is “neoliberal capitalism” (Galloway 15). The charges are 
then pretty thickly laid: ideologue of contemporary capitalism, old wine in a new bottle, 
the valorization of polymorphic becoming as an inherent good in itself. Her coup, her 
unmooring, her sole contribution: plasticity4; we are given yet another black night into 
which all cows disappear. Such is Malabou, dissipating unceremoniously in the voracity 
of her own conceptual creation5.  
                                                 
3
 This critique is vapid and is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of Malabou’s articulation of 
plasticity. This ostensible objection is akin to posing to Charles Darwin: is it not true that, in asserting 
evolution as a universal principle of life, you may be stultifying the very idea you yourself propound? Does 
evolution not itself evolve? It is a puerile and intellectually empty approach fueled, it seems, by a small 
dose of jouissance attained through discerning a superficial contradiction that really, upon the slightest 
examination, has no bearing on anything. 
4
 “…one wonders if Malabou’s commerce of being is not too intimately related to the mode of production. 
In other words, is a theory of plasticity necessarily also a theory of today’s economy?” (Galloway 14-5). 
The arguments levied here against Malabou from Galloway are exactly the same familiar critiques that have 
been deployed against Galloway’s prioritized thinker, Deleuze, since the co-publication of Anti-Oedipus 
and A Thousand Plateaus with Felix Guatarri.  To simply regurgitate with a mirror – in a sophomoric game 
of ‘no you are’ – leaves one feeling that Galloway is almost comically self-unaware or that he may, for 
some reason, be inciting readers. Either way, it both reflects poorly on him and fails to contribute to the 
efficacy of his argument.  
5
 Galloway’s concerns here seem representative of what seem to be some of the main problems voiced in 
response to Malabou, gleaning from both published formal mediums and seminars and academic exchanges 
(on which one must presently rely given the relative paucity of extensive work on her). She is viewed, 
because of the ubiquity of plasticity in her work, a kind of ‘one-trick pony’ peddling a concept which, 
because of its very plasticity, becomes conceptually meaningless. Yet, I contend that by focusing too much 
on plasticity, these accounts miss the philosophical reasons that Malabou develops plasticity. The other 
distinct strand of criticism directed towards Malabou comes from her treatment of neuroscience. See 
Hannah Proctor’s “Neuronal Ideologies” or Florence Chiew’s “Neuroplasticity as an Ecology of Mind” for 
criticisms of Malabou in this regard. For a psychoanalytically grounded criticism of Malabou’s The New 
Wounded, see Slavoj Žižek Living in the End Times 291-314. To vindicate the claim that Galloway’s 
publication may have detrimentally influenced Malabou’s reception, see especially Proctor’s essay in 
where she relies on Galloway’s exegesis, advancing her case against Malabou vis-à-vis a, essentially 
reiterative, deployment of Galloway’s arguments: “…Malabou…approaches the brain already armed with 
her own theory of plasticity, which, though characterized by mutability, is paradoxically unchanging, 
universal” (Proctor 1); “…if Malabou's plastic explosions are always local rather than global, individual 
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The reception of Malabou’s thinking has, however, not all been solely negative; quite the 
contrary. Evaluations of Malabou’s thinking have been complimentary, especially in 
regards to her willingness to cross traditionally rigid disciplinary boundaries – writ large, 
the sciences and the humanities – in order to engage different modes of knowledge into 
constructive dialogue with one another6. Reception of Malabou’s first work The Future of 
Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, Dialectic (1996/2004) is largely adulatory; recognized as 
one of the more significant publications on Hegel in recent scholarship, it holds a central 
place within a growing corpus – including work of Judith Butler, Frederic Jameson, 
Adrian Johnston, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Slavoj Žižek – of ongoing contemporary re-
appraisals, defenses and creative or plastic readings of Hegelian thought7. However, 
beyond this initial publication, engagement with and critical elaboration of Malabou’s 
work is decidedly narrow. Her next significant work, The Heidegger Change: On the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
rather than collective, surely this conforms precisely to the very image of contemporary capitalism she is 
seeking to undermine” (Proctor 5); “[a]s Galloway notes, despite her insistence to the contrary, Malabou's 
understanding of plasticity is itself an ideology of the mode of production, which, with its emphasis on 
'absolute exchangeability', echoes Marx's attacks on capitalism—and, like capitalism, has no outside.” 
(Proctor 5) 
6
 In staging a visible dialogue between these two modes of thought, Malabou is pushing both the 
humanities and sciences towards their own ‘unthought’, forcing them to confront one another, showing that 
they have much to give to one another in terms of support, fraternity and supplementation. In a recent piece 
for Transeuropeennes, Malabou delivered an address entitled “The Future of the Humanities”. In it she 
states precisely that the “frontiers between the Humanities and the Sciences must be redrawn” (1).  In this 
sense, Malabou operates in the space opened up by the project of deconstruction: she is (one of) the 
future(s) envisaged by both Foucault in the Order of Things – the production of a counter-science which 
forces disciplines to speak back and mutually supplement each other – as well as the force of resistance 
called for by Derrida in the “University without Condition”; an avatar of both the future and emerging new 
Humanities.  
7
 Žižek is particularly effusive, writing that Malabou’s The Future of Hegel is: “…one of the books on 
Hegel that, in an almost regular rhythm of every decade or two, mysteriously surface in France, books 
which are epochal in the strictest meaning of the word: they redefine the entire field into which they 
intervene…One cannot but fully agree with Derrida when he wrote that ‘nothing will ever absolve us from 
following step by step, page by page, the extraordinary trajectory of The Future of Hegel…I once again 
urge all to read this book’” (Žižek, Less Than Nothing 17) 
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Fantastic in Philosophy (2004/2010), has received, to date, little to no attention8. 
Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction (2005/2010), a 
metaphilosophical conceptual portrait and intellectual autobiography (Malabou 1, 65, 81), 
has been the subject of numerous reviews but, essentially, only that9; it is treated as an 
introduction, a theoretical roadmap that Malabou draws herself for her readers to follow 
her in her peripatetic explorations of the dialectic, destruction, deconstruction, Hegel, 
Heidegger and Derrida. The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage 
(2008/2012), has fared a little better in terms of visibility, but the reviews of Malabou’s 
confrontation of neuroscience and psychoanalysis are mostly cool, if not critical10. Her 
work Changing Difference: The Feminine and the Question of Philosophy (2009/2011) 
has, unfortunately, suffered the same fate as her text on Heidegger, being treated in only 
                                                 
8
 There has been little engagement – if any at all – with Malabou’s work The Heidegger Change: The 
Fantastic in Philosophy (2004/2010). Ian James’s The New French Philosophy discusses Malabou’s oeuvre 
as a whole, glossing some of the main arguments and moves that Malabou makes in her idiosyncratic 
reading of Heidegger. Other than James’s survey of contemporary French thought (again, like Galloway, 
placing Malabou in the company of figures like Alain Badiou, Francois Laruelle, Jacques Ranciere, Jean–
Luc Nancy, Bernard Stiegler), there has been one review published (Avello Publishing Journal Vol. 1, No. 
1. 2011 Editor: Jason Wakefield) and little else but cursory acknowledgement of Malabou’s work on 
Heidegger in overviews or introductions of her philosophy. As one of the main texts that comprise the 
bedrock of her theoretical project, the lack of engagement with The Heidegger Change is both curious and 
unfortunate. While The Future of Hegel (1996) is a revised version of Malabou’s doctoral work, The 
Heidegger Change, published in French in 2004, represents one of Malabou’s first mature works. It is 
arguably the most important text in her oeuvre to understand how she comes to posit the absolute priority 
of metamorphosis, change or transformation over any other ontological principle (namely that of differance 
– against Derrida – and difference – against Deleuze). Familiarity with this text enriches considerably one’s 
understanding and feel for Malabou’s philosophical project. 
 
9
 Some selected examples: Bhandar, Brenna and Goldberg-Hiller Johnathan. Rev. Plasticity at the Dusk of 
Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction, Catherine Malabou. Theory and Event, 14.1 (2011). 
Online; Protevi, John. Rev. Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction, 
Catherine Malabou. Notre Dame Philosophical Review, Feb. 22 (2010). Online; Lloyd, Chris. Rev. 
Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction, Catherine Malabou. Derrida 
Today, 6, Nov. (2013). Online.  
10
 See Slavoj Žižek’s Living in the End Times 291-314, Hannah Proctor’s “Neuronal Ideologies”, Rada 
Faadek’s  "Catherine Malabou’s The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage” for criticisms of 
this work. See Bryan Smyth’s review of The New Wounded in the Notre Dame Philosophical Review and 
José Luis Romanillos’s “Catherine Malabou’s The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage” for 
positive appraisals of the text.  
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less than a handful of reviews11. The same holds true for both her essay Ontology of the 
Accident: An Essay on Destructive Plasticity (2009/2012) as well as her recent co-
publication with Adrian Johnston, Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, 
and Neuroscience (2013).  
It is Malabou’s What Should We Do with Our Brain? (2005/2008) that has garnered the 
most attention and which has assumed priority in the critical reception of her work, acting 
as the touchstone or aperture through which Malabou’s philosophy is either referenced, 
entered or read through. This is not entirely surprising given the novelty of its subject 
matter – a Hegelian reading of the neuroscientific ontogenesis of the subject and its 
relation with the spirit of capitalism – and the overtly political tenor of the book, which is 
signaled immediately in its opening line, a paraphrase of Karl Marx’s famous line in the 
Eighteenth Brumaire: “The brain is a work, and we do not know it. We are its subjects – 
authors and products at once – and we do not know it” (Malabou, WB 1). The text 
comprises a call to a new consciousness of the historicity of the brain – and thus of 
ourselves – and a solicitation, a challenge to seriously countenance our radical possibility 
and push back against a world that everywhere seeks to occlude our primordial capacity 
for, in Malabou’s critical vocabulary, not merely flexibility (WB 12), the ability to only 
docilely con-form, but rather for plasticity: the ability to resist and reform, to create and 
constitute not just be constituted. Teeming with emancipatory valences concerning the 
‘constructive’ and ‘recuperative’ nature of plasticity and the open-ended, processual (and 
dialectical)12 constitution of the brain, the work has drawn, understandably, most of the 
                                                 
11
 Stone, Alison. “Book Review: Catherine Malabou’s Changing Difference”. Rev. of Changing 
Difference: The Feminine and the Question of Philosophy, Catherine Malabou. The London School of 
Economics and Political Science Review of Books. May 15th (2012). Online; Kizuk, Sarah. “Changing 
Difference, Reviewed by Sarah Kizuk”. Rev. of Changing Difference: The Feminine and the Question of 
Philosophy, Catherine Malabou. Society and Space Open Site. Online.  
12
 I place dialectical here in brackets because there are a number of articles cropping up in where Malabou 
is taken up – or obliquely referenced – in conversation with theoretical orientations indebted to Deleuze 
and it should be remembered that there may be irreconcilable barriers between Malabou and anything 
broadly Deleuzian given Malabou’s staunch commitment to both contradiction and dialectics. Here I refer 
to, specifically, for instance, JD Dewsbury’s “The Deleuzo-Guattarian Assemblage: Plastic Habits”, 
Andrew Lapworth’s “Habit, art, and the plasticity of the subject: the ontogenetic shock of the bioart 
encounter” and Elizabeth Grosz’s “Habit Today: Ravaisson, Bergson, Deleuze”. For instance, Dewsbury 
writes: “…the agenda proposed is exampled through understanding the assemblage concept through the 
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critical attention and, perhaps, rightly so. It is the most explicitly political text of 
Malabou’s, where the stakes of her project for our contemporary moment are most clearly 
put in relief, as well as being the most outwardly novel in its idiosyncratic attempt to 
synthesize philosophy and neurobiology in order to fashion a new mode of agentive 
materialist subjectivity through a politicization of the brain. It is also the most hopeful 
and empowering in the sense of Baruch Spinoza, stylistically employing the tenor and 
rhetorical gestures of a concerted manifesto: it is a call to arms, in where reading it you 
feel your power of activity increase, a joyful surge within you, and your sad passions 
slightly diminish.  
However, the focus granted to WB in appraisals of Malabou’s thought has led to a 
number of inadvertencies that somewhat distort the sum picture of and potentially 
obscure the breadth and nuance as well as intelligibility and originality of Malabou’s 
unfolding project. The emphasis placed on Malabou’s engagements with neuroplasticity 
and individual self-shaping unduly circumscribe the scope and gravity of Malabou’s 
thought by inadequately situating it within her larger ontological project of a plasticity of 
being qua being of which neuroscience is one expression. Interpretations that frame 
Malabou’s philosophical interventions as being limited to neuro-plastic self-shaping also 
creates the undue impression that she is concerned primarily or only with the individual 
and individual transformation, thereby obfuscating the broader socio-political, collective 
and geopolitical registers to which her work richly speaks. Malabou’s discussion of the 
plasticity of the brain does not merely pertain to the individual subject or subjects13 – our 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
work of Catherine Malabou on that of plasticity and habit, clear extensions in the 21st century of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s earlier ideas” (148). However, this is anything but clear. These pieces make use of 
Malabou’s conceptual work in conjunction with vitalist and Deleuzian indebted projects baldly eliding or 
even surreptitiously erasing important distinctions to made between Malabou’s own project – premised 
fundamentally on a firm belief in negativity – and something that is broadly vitalist in tenor – which admits 
no negativity whatsoever.  
13
 If rendered or construed as such and read strictly at the level of the personal, Malabou’s thought is quite 
easily conflated with a broad trajectory of post-Foucauldian discourse concerning the care or art of the self 
– the ethics of self-shaping, self-making, self-sculpturing – or, worse, made indistinguishable from a 
liberalist atomism in where we can pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps and rationally change by our 
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personal capacity to change nor only to neuroscience itself – but more generally 
implicates the plasticity of being itself  in all of its social, political and planetary 
organizations and forms. Indeed, what seems neglected as well in critical engagements 
with and appraisals of Malabou’s WB – as well with discussions of NW – is Malabou’s 
insistence on the social, collective and geopolitical registers of her investigations into the 
plasticity of the brain. While only inchoately sketched out, the conclusions of both 
Malabou’s books on the brain and plasticity – the constructive plasticity of WB and the 
destructive plasticity of NW – each end with suggestive invocations of the social, political 
and planetary pertinence of her thinking. In WB, it is the call for a new ‘biological alter-
globalism’ (78), a plastic community to come, and throughout NW, it is the suggestion to 
grasp the similarities between psychic trauma and socio-political, global (213), and I 
argue, even planetary trauma. As Malabou states in a lecture entitled “From Sorrow to 
Indifference: Current Politics and the Emotional Brain”: 
The objective neurological impact of trauma makes it possible to sketch a new world 
wide typology of psychic illness that pertaining neither to neuroses or psychoses allows 
the disaffected faces of the victims to appear at the border between nature and 
community. As we look at these faces, it is impossible to forget what unites them and 
effaces the distinction between lesional trauma, socio-political trauma and trauma caused 
by natural cataclysms. The difference among the sources of such wounds can tend to, in 
fact, become blurred on the level of their effects (Malabou) 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
own will (I thank Michael Gardiner for posing this problem to me). If this were truly the case, one could 
ask: what is new about what Malabou and what is the point of her book? As Andrew Goffey suggests in his 
negative review of her work, Malabou’s contribution seems a little “fruitless” beyond pointing out some 
tensions in neuroscientific research from a ‘Hegelian’ perspective (51). While this is certainly an element 
of her thought, this characterization of Malabou potentially reduces her to being a mere proponent of an 
atomistic micropolitics from which she must be carefully distinguished (the reasons of which are glossed in 
the above footnote). The speculative proposition implicit in Malabou’s work is that, not only do individual 
subjects operate according to an open ended dialectical plasticity, but that it is society, political structures 
and even the earth itself – all of being – that functions according to the same metamorphic ontology of 
sculpturing. It is not only the self that is a finite materiality to be sculpted, but the social, political and 
planetary as well.  
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Thus, we have open invitations to speculatively transpose Malabou’s discussion of the 
local neuronal operations of plasticity into significantly wider macro registers14.  
The priority of WB in the critical reception of Malabou thus, whether it is negatively or 
positive appraised, and, inadvertently or not, risks rendering her contributions as a thinker 
coterminous with this line of inquiry, depicting her as a thinker who is concerned strictly 
with neuroplasticity or a rapprochement between the humanities and sciences. While 
these are certainly worthwhile pursuits in their own right, and are central features of 
Malabou’s itinerary, representing Malabou only as such effectively deracinates her 
investigations into neuroplasticity from her larger philosophical project of elaborating a 
materialist ontology of plasticity qua being itself of which, again, neuroplasticity is a 
striking expression thereof. This overdetermination of Malabou risks effacing the 
arguably more important issue: the philosophical bases and reasons of why Malabou 
needs or conceptually develops plasticity in the first place. What must be remembered is 
that plasticity is not a beginning point but rather a result, developed or created in 
response to a philosophical problem for which there was not an adequate solution; 
otherwise, evidently, the deployment of plasticity would itself be a superfluity, with no 
reason for existence or circulation. To understand the importance of plasticity clearly, one 
must identify precisely the parameters and impetus of her philosophical project so as to 
ascertain why it is that Malabou needs plasticity. That is, the more fundamental question 
should be: what is Malabou attempting to think that necessitates the development and 
deployment of plasticity and, secondly, what kind of ontological vision does plasticity 
enable us to intelligibly think? Despite insisting on this approach to Malabou’s work, I 
am expressly not disavowing or attempting to marginalize plasticity – which would be 
unfeasible given its centrality to her oeuvre – but arguing rather that an understanding of 
plasticity is significantly enriched by performing the necessary work of situating it within 
                                                 
14
 As Malabou states: “Between the system of absolute knowledge or of absolute subjectivity in Hegel and 
the nervous system in neurobiology, the difference is not so dramatic. It is the same mode of being, the 
same functioning, the same economy…I am insisting upon the community between different kinds of 
systematic plastic organizations” (“Conversation with Catherine Malabou” 6).  
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Malabou’s larger theoretical project, a task, after which having been completed, will 
make plasticity’s conceptual force and import fully intelligible.  
 
1.2 Malabou’s New Materialism: Against Transcendent(s) 
 
I continue to defend the thesis that the only valid philosophical path today lies in 
the elaboration of a new materialism…a materialism, as the basis for a new 
philosophy of spirit… - Malabou, NW 212-3 
To state that nothing is unconvertible amounts to claiming the philosophical 
necessity of the thought of a new materialism, which does not believe in the 
“formless” and implies the vision of a malleable real… - Malabou, PDW 77 
What, then, is Malabou’s ontological vision and why does she need plasticity to render it 
intelligible? As gleaned from the quotes above, Malabou self-avowedly pursues a new 
materialism, the core tenet of which can be succinctly expressed as the coherent 
elaboration of a purely immanentist materialism bereft of any semblance of extraresidual 
exteriority, outside or transcendent(s). Indeed, the insistent subterranean mantra of all 
Malabou’s work is a refutation of all vestiges of an alterity, an other, a trace that would 
affect to escape or be able to flee the frontiers of Being (PDW 40, 71). It is this, the cold, 
sober and complete affirmation of the absolute immanence of material being and the utter 
negation of any palliative ‘elsewhere’, that animates and defines the core ontological 
claim at the center of Malabou’s thought: “We cannot leave Being. Being is that which is 
impossible to escape…” (PDW 43). Material being, for Malabou, can thus be described 
as a closed totality, an unsurpassable One-All which she variously renders, 
interchangeably throughout her writing, as a totally immanent structure, system or 
economy15: “as a Hegelian, I am quite convinced that…we are living in a closed 
                                                 
15
 It is here that Malabou’s difference from the other Neo-Hegelian materialists (Badiou, Žižek, Johnston) 
is most clearly marked. Whereas they posit an ontological Non-All vis-à-vis the assertion of the barred 
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organizational structure…” (“CWM” 10; emphasis mine); “Being schematizes itself 
and…cannot be explained by anything external to the System” (FH 17; emphasis mine); 
“…ontology is an economy. There is nothing beyond it…” (PDW 44; emphasis mine). 
Being is a structure, a system, an economy of the schematization of matter into which, as 
existing, we take form and are irrevocably thrown into without reprieve, hope or solace 
construed in any traditional philosophical sense of there being the possibility of an 
inviolable ‘beyond’ – like the other, the trace, the outside – upon which to draw that 
would resist, disrupt or exceed materialization: there is “…no irruptive transcendence, 
there is no open door to the pure event. Nor any messianism” (Malabou, PDW 44); 
“Today I have serious reservations about such a ‘beyond’. All in all, I have never really 
believed in an alterity of pure dissymmetry. Perhaps it comes from some sort of 
dialectical stubbornness, but I can believe only in the concept of an articulated alterity, 
attached to that of which it is the alterity…” (Malabou, PDW 41); “I don’t believe in 
transcendence at all. I don’t believe in something like the absolute Other, or in any kind 
of transcendence or openness to the other” (Malabou, “CWM” 10). There is Being, that 
is, matter, and that is all16.  
For the purposes of elaborating a veritable materialism, rigorously averring this purely 
immanent encompassing system that strictly prohibits the appeal to a transcendent 
outside is crucial to Malabou because, according to her, previous attempts to disrupt 
metaphysical thought by mobilizing an idea of an inviolable, non-incorporable excess – 
her privileged examples are Emmanuel Levinas’s ‘Other’ and Derrida’s the ‘trace’ (PDW 
76-8, “The Living Room: Hospitality and Plasticity” 3-6), but another implicit target 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
subject by reading Hegel through Lacan, Malabou instead reads Hegel through Heidegger and Derrida, 
arguing for a total One-All ontological structure.  
16
 Malabou thus firmly invalidates the clandestine intrusion of a Kantianism into her thought that she sees 
afflicting the work of her mentor, Jacques Derrida, and the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, who both affirm 
the existence of an excess of the other or the trace which is undeconstructible, unknowable or 
undialectizable. See PDW’s “Afterword” 65-83.  
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could be Gilles Deleuze’s difference and any other ‘aneconomic’ logics – essentially 
reproduce the logic of metaphysics and, also, of capitalism, by fetishistically asserting 
the existence of something which is unconvertible or unchangeable (PDW 76-8, HC 276). 
Counterintuitively, Malabou argues that it is not absolute presence or exchangeability that 
defines metaphysical and capitalistic thinking, but rather the way in which both obscure 
or conceal the contingent grounds of their emergence, that is, that they are, in fact, both 
exchangeable, capable of transformation, substitution or replacement by other forms 
themselves: “…capitalism and metaphysics connect together and buttress each other by 
constituting…a logic of exchange that occludes the meaning of originary 
exchangeability” (Malabou, HC 276; emphasis mine). That is, what is definitive about 
both metaphysics and capitalism (or any ideological formation for that matter) is that they 
seek to conceal the fact that, at one time, they came into presence, that they were 
originally (ex)changed and, thus, can be changed again. Thus, for Malabou: 
To affirm the existence of something that remains inconvertible, whatever this 
may be, is to affirm that this very something does not enter into the game of 
substitution, remaining outside of the circle, holding itself separate from the 
economy… if the trace is considered to be absolutely inconvertible, utterly 
resistant to the play of exchanges, to circulation, to the economy of presence, then 
it becomes substantial. It is no longer a trace, but a substance (Malabou, “The 
Living Room: Hospitality and Plasticity” 4)  
This process of substantialization thus coincides with, Malabou argues, the logic of the 
fetish as described by Marx: “[t]he assertion of inconvertibility lies, for Marx, at the heart 
of fetishism. On the face of it, the fetish always occurs outside the operation of exchange, 
outside the market…stating that the trace is inconvertible…it acquires the status of a 
substance or fetish” (PDW 76-7). The insistence upon a radical alterity, exteriority or 
otherness that escapes the operation of exchange, Malabou shows, is to actually 
reinscribe the metaphysical-capitalist logic one is purportedly undermining in the positing 
of an ostensibly ‘disruptive’ exteriority or inconvertible. This operation is, in fact, 
structurally homologous with metaphysics and capitalism which represent themselves as 
inconvertible, purely beyond exchange; it is exactly their own exchangeability and 
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convertibility that they wish to obfuscate: everything can be (ex)changed with the 
exception of themselves. This is why criticisms levied against Malabou’s assertion of 
‘absolute exchangeability’ as coinciding with the logic if capitalism, such as those 
proffered by Alexander Galloway and Hannah Proctor, wholly miss the mark. Proctor 
writes: “…despite her insistence to the contrary, Malabou's understanding of plasticity is 
itself an ideology of the mode of production, which, with its emphasis on 'absolute 
exchangeability', echoes Marx's attacks on capitalism—and, like capitalism, has no 
outside” (Proctor 5). Galloway expands further and more sharply: 
…one wonders if Malabou’s commerce of being is not too intimately related to 
the mode of production. In other words, is a theory of plasticity necessarily also a 
theory of today’s economy? Malabou’s plasticity is a voracious monster that can 
gobble up any and all foes into itself. Of course, one says the same of Hegel’s 
dialectic, but one also says the same of neoliberal capitalism. So when Malabou 
says that “absolute exchangeability is the structure” and feels no sense of nausea 
in uttering such claim, one cannot help but recall the strains of intense scorn 
lurking on the pages of Marx’s Capital when such a description of the world first 
found its voice…Or consider when Malabou observes – uncritically mind you – 
that “in Heidegger’s philosophy metaphysics and capitalism coincide”…One 
wonders how this could not be the ideology of capitalism returning again, only 
this time all the more cynical as it comes from the mouth of its putative critic. (15; 
emphasis mine) 
There are many things that could be said here – especially with regards to the rather 
hostile tone and language – however, the most egregious and bald inaccuracy concerns 
Galloway’s imputation of Malabou’s ‘uncritically’ minded alignment of metaphysics and 
capitalism. As elaborated above, Malabou’s contention that metaphysics and capitalism 
coincide, while provocative, is anything but uncritical: it is rather explicitly so in a 
sophisticated and dialectically elegant fashion. The reproach that a theorist’s thinking 
maps on to or directly reflects the mode of production is both easy and lazy, 
sensationalized conjecture parading as profundity. Here it almost broaches the limit of 
credulity in respect to Galloway and Proctor as they so transparently fail to understand 
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Malabou’s explicitly critical, nuanced and insightful argument – or, more generously, 
simply fail to consult the text, which so patently contradicts the charges of ‘ideological 
complicity’ laid against Malabou.  
A second related argument that Galloway and Proctor both proffer against Malabou, 
regarding the seemingly static, universal and fixed status of plasticity, is admittedly more 
feasible, as it is an immanently grounded critique that potentially might locate a 
contradiction within Malabou’s own thinking (instead of externally imposing it upon her 
through a textually unsupportable analogical comparison with the mode of production). 
Proctor comments that: “Malabou…approaches the brain already armed with her own 
theory of plasticity, which, though characterized by mutability, is paradoxically 
unchanging, universal” (1; emphasis mine). Galloway similarly argues: “…the irony is 
clear: the plastic as the universal. The thing most associated with change is the thing that 
does not change…[m]ight it be possible then that plasticity itself has to change? 
(Malabou does this kind of trick quite often)” (3). Ignoring the derisive rhetoric again, the 
point being made is apropos: if Malabou’s thought seeks to eviscerate any substantial, 
transcendent principle, does her own concept of plasticity not match this exact criteria? 
That is, does Malabou not, in her own way, contravene her own critique of the 
inconvertible by fetishizing and substantivizing plasticity? While the ubiquity and plastic 
explanatory power of plasticity itself is a possible weakness Malabou must address, 
consistent with her own theory of absolute exchangeability, Malabou openly concedes – a 
number of times – that plasticity itself will, and, must, one day, change. As if precisely 
anticipating such objections, Malabou writes in CD: “plasticity is not, I repeat, an empty, 
transcendental instance. Plasticity is nothing outside of its context and supplementarity 
status…plasticity will only last the time of its forms” (65-66). Adducing Derrida’s similar 
confession in Margins of Philosophy that “the efficacity of differánce may very well, 
indeed must, one day be superseded…” (7), Malabou repeats Derrida’s gesture, 
acknowledging that “the plastic replacement will one day be sublated” (66). Again in 
PDW Malabou emphasizes the historicity of plasticity, contending that “it is able to 
momentarily characterize the material organization of thought and being” (61). Contrary 
to the objections made by Galloway and Proctor, Malabou repeatedly foregrounds the 
momentary nature of plasticity throughout her work, arguing not that she has disinterred 
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or divined the eternal ontological principle, but one that, as she says, seems to able to 
characterize the material organization of thought and being at our present historical 
juncture, providing a ‘motor scheme’ through which the present can be made 
intelligible17. Malabou is thus entirely consistent with her own thinking, submitting 
plasticity itself – like everything else – to the prospect of transformation.  
Against the traditional tendency to strategically mobilize an inconvertible transcendent as 
an indigestible or non-incorporable point of resistance against dominant forms of thought, 
such as metaphysics and capitalism, Malabou thus contends that a more effective 
theoretical gesture is to admit that everything is wholly immanent, transformable, 
contingent thus including metaphysics and capitalism themselves in this economy of 
ontological (ex)change. The essential problem with the fundamentally Kantian dualistic 
ontological schema operative in the idea of an ‘outside’ is that it asserts a thing-in-itself 
inaccessible to human understanding and intervention, that which, nevertheless, still 
exerts influence over and purchase on human life. The danger here is that the positing of 
a non-incorporable exteriority provides a purely empty, formal structure that is amenable 
or hospitable to any given content: the ‘thing-in-itself’ could be justice or democracy (as 
in Derrida), the other or the face (as in Levinas), matter or nature (as in the New 
Materialisms of Jane Bennett and William Connolly); or it could very well just as be 
capitalism and the ‘free’ market – its pure formality permits any and every ‘truth’ while 
perniciously providing no critical recourse to those subjected to it because of the implicit 
authority generated by its constitutive inaccessibility and unknowability. The attendant 
                                                 
17
 “All thought needs a scheme, that is, a motif [writing or différance in Derrida, time in Heidegger, 
plasticity in Hegel and Malabou], produced by the rational imagination, enabling it to force open the door 
to an epoch and open up exegetical perspectives suited to it. To think is always to schematize, to go from 
the concept to existence by bringing a transformed concept into existence…A motor scheme, the pure 
image of thought – plasticity, time, writing – is a type of tool capable of generating the greatest quantity of 
energy and information in the text of an epoch. It gathers and develops the meanings and tendencies that 
impregnate the culture at a given moment as floating images, which, constitute, both vaguely and 
definitely, a material “atmosphere” or Stimmung (“humor, “affective tonality”). A motor scheme is what 
Hegel calls the characteristic (Eigentümlichkeit) of an epoch, its style or individual brand. As a general 
design if you wish…For example…it is clear that the enlargement of the concept of writing [in Derrida], 
the passage of its narrow meaning to its modified meaning, was authorized by the initially undefined 
cultural suggestivity of the “model-images” of inscription, code, or program, which activated this culture” 
(PDW 13-4). 
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corollary of this is then a twofold subjection: subjection to the regime of the governing 
‘thing-in-itself’ and, implicitly, a consequent subjection to a similarly unknowable ‘thing-
in-itself’ that would disrupt and change that reigning status quo. That is, if the situation in 
which you exist achieves the status of a naturalized, ontological necessity beyond human 
intervention or accessibility, the only logical recourse of the subjected is to hope for the 
arrival of an equally unknowable and inaccessible event that would challenge and 
dislodge the present ‘thing-in-itself’. This ontological schema thus logically and 
structurally encourages a kind of messianism which, for Malabou, divests subjects of 
agency, cultivating a resigned passivity in where one lives with the feeling that there is 
nothing one can do. To decisively eliminate this empty, formal transcendent placeholder 
is to foreclose its mobilization and expropriate a fundamental ontological resource that 
both subtends the ideological naturalizing operations of metaphysics and capitalism and 
inculcates docile and passive subjective positions. By submitting everything to the 
economy of absolute exchangeability, systems or forms of organization are exposed in 
their proper denaturalized contingency, making claims to necessity or inevitability – such 
as those made by metaphysics and capitalism – vulnerable and open to contestation. This 
ontological move is both monstrous and momentous in equal measures: it is the opening 
up of pure possibility, but with possibility comes exposure and vulnerability that 
accompany existence in a lawless Real that harbors no guarantees; we are both freed by 
and subject to its contingencies. Malabou characterizes this unfolding situation as one of 
a “contradictory couple of saturation and vacancy”: 
Saturation to the extent that the future can, in our time, no longer represent the promise of 
far-off worlds to conquer. The philosophical tradition, reaching its completion, has as its 
double the exhaustion of the outside world. The ‘new world order’ means the 
impossibility of any exotic, isolated, or geopolitically marginal event. Paradoxically, this 
saturation of theoretical and natural space is felt as a vacuum. The major problem of our 
time is the arrival of free time. Technological simplification, the shortening of 
distances…bring about a state in which we must acknowledge that there is nothing more 
to do. The most sterile aspect of the future lies in unemployment, both economic and 
metaphysical, which it promises. But this promise is also a promise of novelty, a promise 
that there are forms of life which must be invented (FH 192).  
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This arrival of absolute saturation and its speculative double of complete vacancy, as 
Malabou writes, is the emergence of truly metaphysical free time: time untethered from 
an ‘ought’, from a ‘supposed’ to be, opened up in the wake of the death of God and the 
Big Other; there is no longer a transcendent ‘suppose to be’ or ‘ought’. This free time 
means “that we can sometimes decide about the future…which means that there is 
something actually to do with it” (PDW 77; emphasis mine). To say, then, that there is no 
aneconomic point, no formal place beyond structure or system, is to decisively shift the 
ontological ground: everything that is has come into being, has originally (ex)changed, 
and thus can change again. Yet, the corollary of this is that responsibility for this change 
lands squarely upon us for its invention. To anticipate, then, questions that will be 
explored later: are we adequate to the possibilities of this free time? Can we resist the 
economic colonization of this opening up of our metaphysical free time? 
 
 
1.3 ‘The Systemic Law of the Deconstructed Real’: 
Plasticity as the Sublation of Material Being 
 
The crucial problem that attends Malabou’s ontological vision of a wholly immanent, 
monistic real is, however, precisely the issue of change: how does one sufficiently 
account for, in an absolute system or closed structure, the possibility of change, 
transformation or difference? If the philosophical bases of Malabou’s project is the 
commitment to coherently elaborating a pure materialism of complete immanence, this is 
to consequently affirm that there is only material being and hence only presence and only 
form; whatever is must be material and thus, must be present, must take form18. The 
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 Malabou’s emphasis on form aligns her with a near contemporary in Alain Badiou whose project is 
motivated by similar problematics: how do we think the emergence of the new with the framework of a 
materialist, ontological formalism? Each thinker makes the structurally homologous theoretical gesture of 
re-writing form as constitutively and internally split or incomplete, that is, sublating or immanentizing 
transcendence within form, matter and structure itself. Another prospective avenue for future research 
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traditional quandaries associated with such a philosophical position are well-known, 
having been the subject of contestation, derision and deconstruction throughout the 20th 
century. If one asserts such a sheer materialism, one runs the risk of being cornered into 
interrelated problems of causal mechanism, determinism and reductionism: form and 
matter, traditionally understood in its decisively influential Cartesian and Newtonian 
inflections, are dumb, inert and passive. Matter is moved, but never moves, 
(pre)determined but never determining, always requiring something else beyond it, 
transcendent to it, to activate and shape it. It has a fate but not a future; form is rendered 
equivalent to presence, static, constrictive, subduing and subordinating difference, 
squelching the singular. The same negative fate befalls notions of system and structure: 
intrinsically rigid, totalizing, monological, violent; incapable of the new, of any kind of 
surprise, bereft of a genuine future. In articulating a post-deconstructive, new materialist 
philosophy, then, predicated on notions such as a form, matter and system, the problem 
facing the thinker pursuing such a project is the task of conceptualizing an ontological 
principle or framework that would satisfactorily respond to these problems. For Malabou, 
what makes such an ontological vision tenable and ultimately intelligible is her discovery 
and subsequent elaboration of plasticity.  
What, then, is plasticity? Again, against claimants who arraign Malabou’s deployment of 
plasticity as a fixed, ready-made, ossified principle, one must insist on tracing and 
reconstructing the migration of plasticity, the manner in which plasticity itself has 
changed, has transformed and taken shape throughout Malabou’s work, how it has slowly 
enlarged its parameters and scope with, and even within, each theoretical work (from FH 
to HC to WB to NW and OA). In a particular sense, Malabou’s own development of the 
concept of plasticity, and, arguably, the sum total of work, exhibits the very logic of 
plasticity she wishes to articulate: how form, matter or a concept changes shape by both 
abruption and acclimation, both stretching and pulled beyond itself without definitively 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
concerns precisely the relationship between the two figures of Malabou and Badiou, being perhaps the two 
most structurally oriented figures of the new, broadly construed, Neo-Hegelian materialist camp.  
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breaking, becoming different while still retaining those birthmarks of identity; how form 
welcomes or withstands with a stoic resiliency, encountering accidents that come to 
constitute the essential. Echoing Derrida19, these are precisely the words in which 
Malabou describes the arrival of plasticity in her thinking, as an imposition, an accident: 
Everything began, or began again, when, ‘falling’ one day onto the term ‘plastic’, 
I was brought to a stop, at once intrigued and grateful. Intrigued by its discreet 
presence in the Hegelian corpus, by that whole realm of the unknowns which 
gestured through it. Grateful for something essential which was suddenly 
recognizable. Attempting to understand it more carefully, I started to study the 
way it functioned in the Hegelian text, focusing my attention onto everything in it 
which referred back to dynamism of the reception and donation of form, hence to 
subjectivity itself in a process of self-determination. It was an ‘accident’ – the 
term ‘plastic’ could at first sight be considered something accidental in Hegel’s 
text – that brought me to the essential…To me it seems rather that plasticity was 
imposed on me…” (FH 185-6) 
Thus, in Malabou’s project we have a kind of metademonstration of the operation and 
capacities of plasticity: a happenstance, an accident that definitively changes the 
migratory course of the form of a thinker’s path, coming to constitute the essential of 
Malabou’s thought itself and through Malabou’s own transformation, there is a 
correlative transformation of the received, habitual form or image of Hegel himself; a 
mutually reciprocal giving of form (to Hegel) and a corollary receiving of form (the 
transformation of Malabou herself through her engagement with Hegel).  
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 Derrida invokes this sentiment of a concept or thought imposing itself upon oneself in a number of 
instances: “…the old, worn-out Greek term aporia, this tired word of philosophy and of logic, has often 
imposed itself upon me, and recently it has done so even more often” (Aporias 13); “…the different 
directions in which I have been able to utilize what I would call provisionally the word or concept 
differánce, or rather let it impose itself on me…” (Margins of Philosophy 3); “ [In regards to 
deconstruction] When I chose that word, or when it imposed itself on me…” (“Letter to a Japanese Friend” 
1).  
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In FH, plasticity proceeds through three different but interrelated articulations which 
successively enlarge in scope: its role in the temporal process of self-determining 
subjectivity; its regulatory functioning in the dialectical system; and, lastly, adumbrations 
of an ontological meaning beyond the Hegelian system (which are then expanded upon in 
HC). Malabou first discovers this word in the preface to Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit, in the context of Hegel characterizing the formation of subjectivity as being a 
fundamentally ‘plastic’ process (Malabou, “CWM” 6). Hegel uses this adjective earlier in 
the course of his Aesthetics in reference to the ‘plastic arts’, primarily connoting the 
reception and donation of form with allusions to the work of sculpturing in Greek art 
(Malabou, FH 9). Deriving from the Greek plassein, meaning ‘to mould’, ‘plastic’ 
consists of two primary valences: “on the one hand, to be ‘susceptible to changes of 
form’ or malleable (clay is a ‘plastic’ material); and on the hand other hand, ‘having the 
power to bestow form, the power to mould’, as in the expressions, ‘plastic surgeon’ and 
‘plastic arts’” (Malabou, FH 9). Plasticity thus designates the “ontological seesaw” of 
matter’s own dialectical interplay of activity and passivity, of suture and rupture, of 
sedimentation and reactivation, of formation and deformation, of the essential capacity to 
be both given over to the world – susceptible to being shaped by the outside – as well as 
give shape to itself and the world in which it exists – capable of formation, construction 
and self-shaping (Malabou, FH 188). To clarify, while the primary registers of plasticity 
expressly concern shaping, becoming and metabolism, it is not, Malabou emphatically 
maintains, to be confused with polymorphism (FH 8)20. Contrary to the implications of 
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 This is a qualification that Malabou reiterates rather unequivocally throughout her work: “…‘plasticity’ 
does not mean ‘polymorphous’” (FH 10); “Plasticity is not polymorphism” (FH 180); “…plasticity… 
involves, not an infinite modifiability–we have not yet come back around to polymorphism...” (WB 16); 
“[o]ne is formed only by virtue of a resistance to form itself; polymorphism, open to all forms, capable of 
donning all masks, adopting all postures, all attitudes, engenders the undoing of identity…it is not creative, 
but reproductive and normative” (WB 71-2). With such explicit prescriptions to differentiate between 
plasticity and polymorphism, it again appears strange that some, like Galloway, see Malabou advancing an 
ethics of perpetual change or becoming in where transformation is an ethical imperative in and of itself 
(“French Thought Today” 5, 13). Galloway asks: “Why, when we hold a mirror up to nature, do we see 
nothing reflected back but the mode of production?... shouldn’t [Malabou’s] reflection of nature show 
something other than a sad image of a life lived in perpetual triage: separating the good plasticity (self–
fashioning) from the bad (the churn of the market)?” (15). As a finite material self, what is life except a 
perpetual triage and what makes this a ‘sad image’? Malabou’s point is that as finite expressions of matter, 
we do live on a clock; as matter we are always already changing, fashioning, being adapted and formed if 
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infinite adaptability or flexibility that undergird the polymorphic, Malabou insists that 
“[t]hings that are plastic preserve their shape, as does the marble in a statue: once given a 
configuration, it is unable to recover its initial form. ‘Plastic’, thus, designates those 
things that lend themselves to being formed while resisting deformation” (FH 9); first 
emphasis mine). Expanding on this topic in a later work, again articulated through the 
analogy of sculpting, Malabou writes:  
Plastic material retains an imprint and thereby resists endless polymorphism. This 
is the case, for instance, with sculpted marble. Once the statue is finished, there is 
no possible return to the indeterminacy of the starting point. So plasticity 
designates solidity as much as suppleness, designates the definitive character of 
the imprint, of configuration, or of modification (WB 15) 
A third importance valence of the concept that Malabou draws out to further demarcate 
its departure from the smooth continuities of notions like elasticity, adaptability or 
endless becoming, is plasticity’s annihilative, explosive or destructive capacities. 
Malabou writes:  “A process of formation and of the dissolution of form, plasticity, where 
all birth takes place, should be imagined fundamentally as an ontological combustion 
(déflagration) which liberates the twofold possibility of the appearance and the 
annihilation of presence. It is a process which functions on its own, automatically” (FH 
187). Matter exhibits its own possibility for agency: auto-destruction, self-deformation, 
interruption; Malabou insists that plasticity, in its simultaneous double semantic 
inflection, attests to the elemental nature of negativity and contradiction at the very heart 
of Being itself. This destructive capacity is also simultaneously double: it is monstrous 
and aleatory – the possibility of matter to internally combust, go awry, destroy and 
deform itself – but this internal possibility itself offers ontological resources for 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
we consciously participate, direct or intervene in this process of composition or not. Malabou does not 
prescribe perpetual change, because to do so would be asinine and meaningless: perpetual change happens 
anyway with or without our consent. 
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resistance, for matter to direct this negativity and surge up against congealment and 
petrification– such as the kind of negativity required for socio-political change.  
Malabou’s reading of Hegel, then, in FH unfolds from this initial identification of the 
clandestine importance of plasticity – the threefold capacity for the reception, donation 
and destruction of form – for securing and elucidating the intelligibility and potency of 
Hegel’s understanding of the twofold temporality of dialectically self-determining 
subjectivity. Malabou writes: “…speculative Hegelian philosophy rips the concept 
[plasticity] away from its strict aesthetic ties (or sculptural ties, to be precise), definitively 
conferring the metaphysical dignity of an essential characteristic of subjectivity upon it” 
(PDW 13). Plasticity characterizes, for Malabou, the movement of self-determining in 
subjectivity in Hegel by providing a concept through which the two epochal moments of 
subjectivity in Hegel – the Greek and the Modern – can be rendered coherent. The Greek 
moment of subjectivity is that of substance represented by Aristotle and the Modern 
moment is that of subject represented by Kant (Malabou, FH 16-7). These two moments, 
the Greek and the Modern, represent two forms of temporality respectively:  
On one side, the epoch marked by the repetitions and habits inherent to the 
teleological process. On the other, the epoch dominated by the singular ‘one and 
only’, by the non-habitual, inseparable from the concept of time as external. This 
confrontation also presents the outline of the future which, henceforth, exists in 
the play of the habitual and the unusual, but no longer to be understood as two 
eras of philosophical thought, rather as the two faces, identical in a speculative 
sense, of one reality…. (Malabou, FH 190) 
These two temporalities refer to two different regimes of change: one represents the 
gradual incline, the calm linearity we experience in our everyday life, and the other 
signifies the ruptural events that re-organize our lives in sharper, sudden fashions. 
Malabou articulates this double temporality in the phrase voir venir, meaning, in English, 
‘to see (what is) coming’. This sentiment is difficult to adequately translate, but its 
rendering by Lisabeth During in her translation of FH as ‘to see (what is) coming’ 
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admirably provides a firm sense of the fraught temporality Malabou is trying to 
communicate as the lived, contradictory time of the subject. Malabou writes:  
‘To see (what is) coming’ denotes at once the visibility and the invisibility of 
whatever comes. The future is not the absolutely invisible, a subject of pure 
transcendence objecting to any anticipation at all, to any knowledge, to any 
speech. Nor is the future the absolutely visible, an object clearly and absolutely 
foreseen. It frustrates any anticipation by its precipitation, its power to surprise. 
‘To see (what is) coming’ thus means to see without seeing – await without 
awaiting – a future which is neither present to the gaze nor hidden from it (FH 
184). 
As During notes in her preliminary remarks to the text, voir venir or ‘to see (what is) 
coming’ means, at the same time, “to anticipate while know knowing what comes…the 
parentheses marking the reserve inherent in waiting itself” (FH xlix). This strange 
temporality seeks to express the manner in which our lives unfold through an incessant 
seesaw of indeterminacy and determinacy, contingency and necessity, accident and 
essence, as we know that something must come – being finite material beings inexorably 
moving forward through time – but we can never know exactly what this ‘something’, the 
to-be-revealed determinate content of the indeterminate, will be. ‘To see (what is) 
coming’ thus “stands for the operation of synthetic temporalizing in Hegel’s thought, 
which means it is the structure of anticipation through which subjectivity projects itself in 
advance of itself, and thereby participates in the process of its own determination” 
(Malabou, FH 18; emphasis mine). In this projection out of itself, forward in advance of 
itself, the subject thus does not imperviously and imperiously move forward, swallowing 
all differential content like the voracious mouth of a great whale – the stock image of 
Hegel lodged stubbornly in our intellectual imaginary – but precisely exposes itself by 
thrusting itself forward in and towards a future that it does not know. In the movement of 
externalization, the subject is made vulnerable to that which it does not see coming, 
opening itself up to be transformed by an alterity, a surprise of which one sees the 
indeterminate contours but is partially blind to the determine content: it is passively 
formed as much as it actively forms. Plasticity, in its meaning to both receive and donate 
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form, provides the formal structure through which these two moments, these two ekstases 
of time, can co-exist intelligibly in reciprocal determination and dialectical constitution; 
plasticity names precisely “the condition of possibility” (Malabou, FH 18) for this 
constant (ex)change with one another – the indeterminate and determinate, the contingent 
and necessary, the accidental and necessary –  which creates the moving floor, the 
abgrund ground, that comprises our own subjectivity and experience of the world. For 
Malabou, Hegel’s philosophy consists primarily in thinking the synthesis of these two 
temporal modes of subjectivity and it is plasticity which makes this sublation permissible. 
Taken together, temporality and dialectic, read through plasticity, form the future-
oriented anticipatory structure of the contingent metaphysic of the Hegelian subject21.  
Whereas in the metonymic figures of Aristotle and Kant one facet of the subject is given 
precedence – substance for the former (one here can include Spinoza), subject for the 
latter – Malabou’s reading of plasticity in Hegel reveals that a prioritization is both 
unnecessary and unfeasible, as substance and subject, reception and donation, passivity 
and activity, synchronic and diachronic, the essential and accidental, are fundamentally 
equiprimordial or co-constitutive. Malabou writes:  
It would be futile to want to determine some ontological priority of essence over 
accident, or accident over essence, for their co-implication is primary...[w]hether 
one is prior to the other is not something that can be known. This is what 
Absolute Knowledge knows. Hegelian philosophy assumes as an absolute fact the 
emergence of the random in the very bosom of necessity and the fact that the 
random, the aleatory, becomes necessary (FH 163).  
Malabou strikingly demonstrates here the agile beauty of Hegelian dialectics by revealing 
the speculative identity of two apparently antinomic ideas, dissolving the rigid 
demarcation of the accidental and the essential or the contingent and the necessary: that 
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 One can detect a strong influence of Heidegger here. Malabou’s Hegel is one very much read through 
and with Heidegger. To return to a point made before, Malabou’s philosophical interest resides in what 
form of Hegel exists and can exist after Heidegger, Derrida and Deleuze. Malabou thus attempts to 
determine what form of Hegel is visible, articulable, what form opens up, after his deconstruction.  
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is, there is nothing more necessary than the contingent, or essential than the accident. As 
soon as the car hits you, your foot slips, the lesion irrupts, the flood walls break, these 
contingencies, these accidents instaneously pass into their opposites, becoming the 
heaviest of necessities, coming to transform into essential instances of your life. Equally, 
as in Malabou’s discussion of the naturalizing ideologies of capitalism and metaphysics, 
there is nothing more accidental or contingent than that which insists on donning the 
mask of the essential or the necessary. Malabou argues, then, with a Heideggerian 
inflection, that since the form of the subject exhibits and is able to receive and withstand 
both these moments of subjectivity, because it is open to harboring both histories of 
thinking the self without definitively breaking form, it is virtually split down the middle 
by these two moments; there is a “tipping point running straight down the heart of 
everything – suture and rupture – between a traditional modality of being and a new 
modality of being” (Malabou, PDW 35). Malabou shows through Hegel that the subject is 
nothing but this plasticity, a fragile, tottering middle point, a to and fro situated right in 
the middle of the unfolding sculpting that is a lifetime between the giving and receiving 
of form, shaped by and shaping the world in which one unfurls.   
While operating specifically in Hegel’s own text as characterizing the interplay of the 
reception and donation of form in the self-determination of subjectivity, Malabou intuits 
that plasticity is capable of a substantial enlargement or amplification, that it is able to 
characterize the structuring structure of the movement of the entire dialectical system 
itself; the supple and determining process of the general ontological movement of the 
Hegelian dialectic, the creation and dissolution of form characterizes the grandiose 
becoming of the System itself. After meticulously tracking the local operation of 
plasticity in Hegel’s own discourse concerning subjectivity, Malabou determines that 
plasticity must be enlarged and elevated to the dignity of a notion through its 
transformation into a proper philosophical concept, the formation of a proper concept 
being the operation of  
[taking] up a concept (plasticity), which has a defined and delimited role in the 
philosophy of Hegel, only in order to transform it into the sort of comprehensive 
concept that can ‘grasp’ (saisir) the whole….Transforming plasticity into a 
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concept is a matter of showing that plasticity ‘seizes’ (prend) the philosophy of 
Hegel and allows the reader to ‘comprehend’ it, appearing at one and the same 
time as a structure and condition of intelligibility (Malabou, FH 5). 
Grasping plasticity as this structuring structure permits Malabou to render the Hegelian 
system as being open, processual and fluid against the large contingent of detractors who 
see Hegel as a thinker of a rigid, mechanical dialectical system that harbors no real future 
or possibility of actual difference, alterity or change. Plasticity salvages the notion of the 
future in a closed system by showing that the dialectic does not comprise a kind of 
carnivorous negation that inexorably moves forward, swallowing all difference in the 
service of a re-assertion of, monological, violent self-identity, but consists in equal 
measures of both accident and essence, dissolution and creation and the giving and 
reception of form; it metamorphosizes by means of transformative ruptures which 
preclude any kind of immutable stability or teleological necessity. Most importantly, 
Malabou does not jettison the system of Hegelian thought, but re-envisages the system as 
being plastic, allowing the possibility of change, alterity and a future to organically 
emerge within the structure of the system itself, as: 
plasticity designates the future understood as a future within closure, the 
possibility of structural formation: a transformation of structure within structure, a 
mutation ‘right at the level of form’…the possibility of a closed system to 
welcome new phenomena, all the while transforming itself, is what appears as 
plasticity. Here again we find the process by which a contingent event, or 
accident, touches at the heart of the system, and, in the same breath, changes itself 
into one of the system’s essential elements” (Malabou, FH 192-3).  
With the stark refutation of any transcendence, exteriority or ‘beyond’, identifying the 
plasticity of structure, system or form itself permits Malabou to coherently answer the 
question of: “[w]hat is a ‘way out’; what could a ‘way out’ be when there is no outside, 
no ‘elsewhere’?” (Malabou, PDW 65). Plasticity – the equiprimordial reception and 
donation of form, the co-constitutive temporal play of the accidental and the essential – 
provide the resources for conceiving both a tempered freedom and a genuine future 
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required to think of “how to escape closure…within closure itself” (Malabou, PDW 65). 
Plasticity endows Malabou with the means of thinking how an immanent material 
system, structure or economy is not necessarily consigned to reductionism, determinism, 
or mechanism, without future or possibility, but rather how form, structure and system 
immanently offer the means of difference, alterity and transformation that are 
traditionally posited as being ‘elsewhere’ or ‘outside’ the materiality of being itself. 
Plasticity, then, for Malabou, comes to designate – beyond subjectivity and system, 
however, enfolding and implicating them both – the ontological nature of matter as such, 
the “systemic law of the deconstructed real” (Malabou, PDW 56). Plasticity names not 
only the movement of the becoming of subjectivity and the logic of the dialectical 
system, but, as Malabou adumbrates in FH, the general ontological essence of being 
itself: “Hegel…shows how the twofold tendency of the becoming essential of the 
accident and the becoming accidental of essence [plasticity] is constitutive for all life… 
Ultimately it is a tendency which operates at the level of living. It is automatically 
inscribed ‘right at the level’ of life” (Malabou, FH 193). Indeed, for Malabou, Hegel’s 
system and thought provide the incipient resources for the elaboration of a purely 
immanent, materialist ontology, writing: “it is Hegel who will have discovered before its 
discovery the plastic materiality of being: that free energy, whether organic or synthetic, 
which circulates throughout in each and every life” (Malabou, FH 193).  
In FH, there is thus a successively concentric enlargement of plasticity’s fields of action, 
traversing and circulating among the ontological economy of the three lives in Hegel: 
spiritual (self-determining subjectivity), the logical (the becoming of System) and natural 
life (the ateleological formation and reformation of matter). The question Malabou 
proposes to herself is whether or not the semantic and critical amplification of plasticity 
into a general ontological principle is tenable or not (PDW 13, 24). That is, what 
authorizes this delocalization of plasticity from first, the field of aesthetics, to the domain 
of subjectivity, to that of system, to her initial inchoate intimations of conferring an 
ontological meaning on plasticity itself: is plasticity capable of a more radical 
exportation, can itself change, take another face, figure itself differently? Can plasticity 
itself go-in-drag (Malabou, HC 17,145)? To verify the feasibility or legitimacy of this 
conceptual expansion, Malabou turns to the work of Heidegger, in which she discerns 
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between Heideggerian and Hegelian thought a covert solidity (PDW 38). Malabou 
elaborates on her seditious orchestration: 
Heidegger never speaks about plasticity. Nor does he ever speak about 
metamorphosis [traditionally perceived]. And yet, plasticity inscribes the motive 
of metamorphosis right at the heart of the dialectic, and metamorphosis inscribes 
the motive of plasticity right at the heart of the thought of being. This intersection 
pointed the way for Le Change Heidegger (PDW 28). 
The renegade rapprochement that Malabou seeks to effect between Hegel and Heidegger, 
one of the daring and truly singular facets of her project, consists in her discernment of 
their shared positing of articulated, closed structures or systems of being that requires an 
internal principle of transformation or metamorphosis, that is, plasticity, to make them 
intelligible. Pursuing her elaboration of a purely immanent new materialism in HC, 
Malabou performs an idiosyncratic and imaginative re-reading of Heidegger that 
resembles the primary operations of her work on plasticity in Hegel. In the case of 
Heidegger, Malabou discovers the regulating presence of a marginal group of concepts, 
what she calls the ‘triad of change’ in Heidegger’s work: the three interrelated terms of 
change, transformation and metamorphosis (Malabou, HC 1). The triad of change, 
transformation and metamorphosis constitutes, for Malabou, as was with plasticity in 
Hegel, “the secret agent of Heidegger’s philosophy, what sustains and clandestinely 
guides the destiny of the essential” (HC 7). In tracing the work of these concepts in 
Heidegger’s work, Malabou argues that Heidegger reveals that a primary (ex)change 
occurs at the heart of Being and the beginning of philosophy. Her recurring and sustained 
thesis of this work is to show the “ontological anteriority of fashioning over essence” 
(Malabou, HC 91; emphasis mine), to demonstrate that every presence or form is an entry 
into presence or form, a transformation, change or movement into presence (Malabou, 
CD 136); to manifest is to move, to be present is to present, thus the essence of being is 
not immutability but mutability, as beings must move, transform, change or 
metamorphosize to become, to be present, to be. One could read here Malabou’s attempt 
to demonstrate not only fashioning’s anteriority to essence, but to the other two 
ontological principles of 20th century French philosophy, differánce and difference. That 
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is, to become different or to be a trace is to already have changed. To return to the 
previous discussion of the logic of fetishization, to admit the inconvertibility of a 
principle such as difference or differánce is to substantivize and cede ground to the 
ontological framework one is purportedly disrupting. To posit change as primordial, the 
originary operation of plasticity, of giving and receiving form, is to prohibit, again, any 
ontological schema who would wish to capitalize on the idea of the absolutely 
exceptional, the inconvertible, inaccessible beyond. Malabou thus draws on Heidegger to 
elaborate further her vision of all-encompassing, immanent ontology of an economy of 
being, where being is not stable, immutable or fixed, but convertible, transformable and 
able to change or be changed, that contrary to traditional metaphysics: “[n]othing, for 
Heidegger, escapes (ex)change or convertibility. It must be repeated…ontology is the 
structure of transformation alone. Being is nothing but (its) transformability” (Malabou, 
HC 73); “Being is nothing but its plasticity” (Malabou, PDW 36).  
The dawn of metaphysics, which bequeaths to us our understanding of essence or spirit as 
unchangeable, originates with a fundamental méconnaissance, what Malabou calls, 
among many variegated expressions, the substitution or (ex)change of being for 
beingness. This is the conversion of being/essence/spirit understood as mutable for 
being/essence/spirit as truly or actually immutable, prompting the fundamental cleavage 
between ontic and ontological, matter and spirit, form and essence that structures the 
history of metaphysical, and hence philosophical, thought. Heidegger and Malabou locate 
the symbolic scene of this transformation as the “Allegory of the Cave”, where Plato 
arbitrates the (ex)change, trade or conversion that metamorphosizes the nature of being 
into “true” Being: that is, Being understood in the traditional metaphysical sense of 
hidden, associated with the realm of ideal, stable and immutable essences. In this 
moment, Malabou argues, following Heidegger, Plato brokers a fundamental (ex)change, 
de-privileging and displacing the truth of being as ontic – as appearance, figure or form, 
the mutable –  for the truth of Being as beingness, as spirit, essence, the idea, the 
immutable. This moment constitutes the originary mutation, the transformation or change 
of Being itself: being is (ex)changed with itself, the mutable nature of being 
metamorphosized and presented as the immutable, as essence and truth. Malabou thus 
argues that traditional metaphysical understandings of notions such as essence, presence 
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and being – taken to be fundamentally immutable and fixed – had to be and were initially 
transformed or changed into themselves, that is, they are ontologically mutable or 
fashioned:  The fundamental (ex)change of “mutability for its opposite [immutability, 
fixity, beingness] is exactly what originally gives change in philosophy…” (Malabou, HC 
17).  
For Malabou, Heidegger provides the aperture through which to seize this inaugural 
moment of transformation where the mutability and materiality of being take decisively 
different forms as “Beingness takes being’s place [and being] ‘enters its service’” 
(Malabou, HC 17); “this originary (ex)change – ontological mastery and servitude – 
corresponds to the going-in-drag [travestissement] of essence, and is the most basic 
resource of metaphysics” (Malabou, HC 17). Metaphysics, the way in which it has 
articulated the relationship of essence and form, spirit and matter, has attempted to from 
the very beginning instigate a fundamental dissociation between the two, has from the 
very beginning acted in bad faith by asserting that 
form can be thought separately from the nature of the being that transforms 
itself…form is presented as skin, vestment or finery…that one can always leave 
without an alteration in what is essential…as if one could always rid oneself of 
form, as if, in the evening, form [matter] could be left hanging like a garment on 
the chair of being or essence [spirit]. In metaphysics form can always change, but 
the nature of being persists. It is this that is debatable… . (Malabou, OA 17) 
In her work on Heidegger then, Malabou attempts to demonstrate ontologically that the 
metaphysical severance of the essential and the accidental, spirit and matter, essence and 
form is based on a “misunderstanding”, that “ ‘essence’... has only ever designed, under 
the skin of metaphysics and despite ontological dogma, the transformability of beings, 
never their substantial stability. In the end essence does not say presence; it says entry 
into presence, in other words, an originary movement that, again, is a movement of 
change or exchange” (Malabou, CD 136). Yet, Malabou identifies, as a devoted 
dialectician, that this very metaphysical splitting of form and essence, contrary to the 
wishes of metaphysics, has engendered from the very beginning the means by which this 
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ostensibly immutable separation is to be overcome. The privileging of beingness over 
being  that gives form to traditional metaphysics is at once a transformation and a 
displacement that – we can see the Derridean influence on Malabou’s thinking here22 – 
creates metaphysics – being as beingness – and simultaneously produces that which it 
seeks to de-privilege and suppress, what Malabou calls “the other thinking” or the “other 
thought” or “other beginning”. That is: the inauguration of metaphysics in the change 
from mutability to immutability, in it being a change, paradoxically creates and performs 
the conditions of mutability that will come to undo the immutability metaphysics seeks to 
achieve; the fact that being can be ontologically transformed or exchanged for a new 
understanding of being as beingness demonstrates its essential (ex)changeability. 
Metaphysics, emerging through an original (ex)change, can then conceivably transform 
again; it can shed its skin. Malabou writes:  
Imagine metaphysics shedding its skin…the skin is that of essence, the image, 
value, and substitute for being that was formed in exchange. Imagine metaphysics 
sloughing off its (ex)change. Imagine metaphysics changing. Yes, changing, as 
though it were undressing itself” (Malabou, HC 96).  
Grasping the initial production of the division of Being into being and beingness, form 
and essence, matter and spirit as a transformation, metamorphosis or change engenders 
the requisite antimony to ground a dialectic of transformation from the production of an 
immanent difference within Being itself: Being opens up a space within Being between 
two forms of itself and the interaction of these two forms constitutes the requisite 
material for immanent mutability and transformation without alterity23. This is to say, 
                                                 
22
 Jacques Derrida was Malabou’s doctoral supervisor and a significant theoretical influence. See 
Malabou’s essays “Grammatology and Plasticity” and “The phoenix, the spider and the salamander”  in 
Changing Difference and her book Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing for a sustained engagement with 
Derrida’s thought.  
23
 Malabou likens this to transsubjectivation in the work of Michel Foucault: 
“…transsubjectivation…consists in a trajectory within the self. This transsubjectivation doesn’t mean that 
you become different from what you used to be, nor that you are able to absorb the other’s difference, but 
that you open up a space within yourself between two forms of yourself. That you oppose two forms of 
yourself within yourself…There would then be a kind of transformation which would sublate the difference 
between the self and itself, which would create, produce a new self as a result of the opposition between 
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there is absolutely no substantial, rigid, necessary distinction to be made between form 
and essence, matter and spirit, accident and essence. The nature of the real, as plasticity, 
prescribes nothing but the constancy of change, transformation and metamorphosis; a law 
which strictly contravenes the metaphysical attempt to partition being into neatly 
bifurcated pairs of immutability and mutability, spirit and matter, essence and form. 
Recognizing ontological mutability means acknowledging the true plasticity – the 
changeability, transformability and metamorphic nature – of being itself, of seeing the 
profound interaction and mutual constitution of form and essence, of matter and spirit; 
change of form implies a corollary change in essence, and a change of essence 
necessitates a change in form, being is comprised by the ineluctable dialectical interplay 
of both. It this fundamental “mutability of beings”, Malabou writes, that “opens a future 
in the absence of any openness in the world” (PDW 78). 
 Identifying this originary ontological mutability in Heidegger, Malabou argues, permits 
her to locate, supplement and validate the ontological amplification of plasticity that she 
gestures to at the end of FH as she finds Heidegger provides: “…the nondialectical origin 
(that is, ontological) of the dialectic...Traced back to this origin, the “no” turns out to be 
nothing but a “ ‘yes’ to the annihilation of being…”…that is, it is in fact a “yes” to its 
transformability or mutability (PDW 36; emphasis mine). What Malabou detects only 
inchoately in Hegel’s thought – as she adumbrates at the end of FH, the capacity for 
plasticity to characterize a general ontology based on the dual active/passive nature of 
being – is confirmed by way of Heidegger’s thinking of metamorphosis, of the absolute 
exchangeability of being itself. Malabou explains that the discovery and sustained 
consideration of the triad of change – change, transformation and metamorphosis – in 
Heidegger’s thought opens “…the possibility of conferring an ontological meaning on 
plasticity”, allowing her “to export the concept, explicitly and consciously, outside the 
dialectical framework – a framework that it had already exceeded in The Future of Hegel 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
two forms at work in the self. Plasticity might be the name of this transsubjectivation” (Malabou, “CWM” 
5).  
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but in too indeterminate a fashion” (PDW 36). Tracing the metabolic movement of the 
triad of change in Heidegger’s own philosophical economy, Malabou recognizes the 
operation of the reception, donation and changing of form that Hegel had designated as 
plasticity. For the both plastic subject and system to exist, being itself must too 
fundamentally exhibit these same traits. Heidegger’s metamorphic ontology thus 
corroborates the moving ground of being that makes possible Malabou’s reading of the 
plasticity of subject and system in FH. Malabou thus orchestrates a plastic exchange 
whereby Hegel and Heidegger mutually illuminate and supplement one another, 
soldering them together in a philosophical face-to-face that is at once a suturing and a 
rupturing: Heidegger provides Hegel with the ontological grounding of the dialectic, 
where plasticity loses its name for a moment to become metamorphosis (Malabou, PDW 
37) and, with plasticity,  
it is as if Hegel retrospectively has offered to [Heidegger] an instrument 
indispensable to the intelligibility of his [own] ideas. The times of Hegel’s 
philosophy, with a generosity Heidegger consistently denies, were perhaps 
generous enough to offer him a name for his own time of ontological 
difference…Perhaps what the notion of plasticity makes possible is a way to 
conceive the characteristics of authentic temporality which Heidegger himself 
brought out (Malabou, FH 192; 191).  
Before proceeding, it warrants noting that the rapprochement Malabou enacts/stages 
between Hegel and Heidegger is, perhaps, an outwardly strained coupling. One could say 
– and, admittedly, without fault – that it potentially bears the mark of a conscious, 
coordinated appeal to the counterintuitive, the kind of deliberative juxtaposition designed 
to provoke that often subtends the (now familiar) defamiliarizing rhetorical strategies 
characteristic of much postmodern and consequent contemporary theory. Malabou’s 
‘plastic’ readings could thus be, conceivably, cynically dismissed as another product of 
the excessive liberties and abuse of license that seem all too often to plague our post-
Barthesian and Foucauldian intellectual landscape. Indeed, Malabou’s solicitation of the 
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reader to pursue this untraveled path is in itself a perfect encapsulation of plasticity’s 
profound import for the act and event of reading itself24: are we capable of letting go of 
our particular ‘I’, the form of ourselves, which initially enters our engagement with a new 
text? Are we capable of suspending what we think we know of the forms of both Hegel 
and Heidegger so that both we and themselves may be transformed? Or are we 
determined to refuse surprise, to insist upon maintaining the essential, familiar form of 
both them and ourselves through our encounter with this accidental union, in placing 
them in a proximity which discomfits our habituated understanding? In regards to this 
point, Malabou references Maurice Blanchot’s The Space of Literature in her meditation 
on the plasticity inherent in the act of reading and the concomitant task of thinking: 
“What threatens reading is this: the reader’s reality, his personality, his immodesty, his 
stubborn insistence upon remaining himself in the face of what he reads…” (Quoted in 
Malabou, FH 182). It is precisely, Malabou writes, the immodesty of the ‘knowing I’, 
which clings to itself in self-certainty, that “occults true reading” (FH 182). It is, in fact, 
exactly the opposite, “[t]he letting-go of the Self in the act of reading…[that] produces 
the condition of the possibility of decision” (FH 182), the genuine opening of the 
possibility of a new reading, a new form to take shape, a truly reciprocal exchange and 
transformation of the reader and the text25.  
Malabou’s proposed proximity of Hegel and Heidegger demands and deserves such a 
generosity on behalf of her interlocutors. In committing to open ourselves up and follow 
Malabou’s invitation to let the forms of Hegel and Heidegger de-ossify, they alchemize, 
becoming re-actualized, transformed and emerge anew in their clandestine crossing, the 
                                                 
24
 Malabou’s elaboration of the plasticity of reading in regards to the Hegelian differences between 
predicative or ratiocinative and properly speculative propositions is a stunning and moving account of the 
possibilities for transformative reading. Her account, articulated through Hegel, has much to offer to 
literary theory and practice and for the humanities – embroiled as they are in a seemingly interminable 
defence of the value of reading – in general. See FH 176-183.  
25
 Here, again, is a striking demonstration of how plasticity does seem to characterize the very essence of 
Hegel’s thinking, as Hegel concurs with both Blanchot and Malabou in writing that philosophy or thinking 
depends upon the relinquishment of “any personal intrusions into the immanent rhythm of the concept, and 
not intervene in it either arbitrarily or with wisdom obtained elsewhere” (Quoted in Malabou, FH 182). In 
Heidegger one finds a similar prescription, to open oneself up to and follow the path of thinking, to heed 
the call of that which both appears and withdraws from us.   
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meeting point of which is the essential fulcrum of Malabou’s vision of a new 
materialism: a thinking of closed, immanent materiality that does not require 
transcendence to account for change, but locates the capacity of transformation – spirit – 
right within the closure of this structure or system – matter – itself. The hitherto 
unacknowledged profound consonance Malabou uncovers between Heidegger and Hegel 
is precisely the shared commitment to the ontological primordiality of change itself; that 
being’s principle, defining characteristic is its immanent self-sufficient capacity for 
transformation. What Malabou unearths in Hegel and Heidegger is the possibility to think 
a closed, immanent economy of being that can internally account for alterity, change, 
difference, she unveils the  “the plastic materiality of being: that free energy, whether 
organic or synthetic, which circulates throughout in each and every life” (Malabou, FH 
193). Through reading Heidegger and Hegel across and through one another, 
transforming them, Malabou discovers the resources for conceiving her vision of a 
thoroughly closed, materialist ontological system, one that is not restrictive or static, 
mechanistic or reductive, but immanently fluid and open because, in the course of her 
philosophical search, she determines that “Being is none other than changing forms; 
being is nothing but its own mutability” (Malabou, PDW 43, 78; emphasis mine), 
because,  
plasticity…is so fundamental (the mutability of presence is older than presence) 
that there is no perhaps no reason to talk of the plasticity of Being – as if plasticity 
were some kind of quality – but of saying that Being is nothing but its plasticity” 
(PDW 36; emphasis mine) 
Like the anticlimactic nature of Absolute Knowledge in Hegel or the withdrawal of Being 
in Heidegger, Malabou’s ultimate ontological conclusion (and subsequent ontological 
premise) seems to meld at once the deflatingly prosaic and the debilitatingly profound: 
what she asserts is the sheer, plain fact that Being – that is the matter or materiality that 
we are and which we are enmeshed/embedded – is absolutely indifferent, utterly bereft of 
any modicum of transcendent design or guarantee. It is essentially only materialized 
contingency. Being is nothing but its plasticity: the systemic law of the deconstructed real 
is simply finite matter’s ontological capacity to form, be formed and perish. One is, 
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ultimately, nothing less and nothing more. This movement of materiality is automatic. 
Plasticity names the ateleological speculative automatism of the closed economy of 
Being, automatism naming the dialectical interplay of the essential and accidental 
embedded in automatism’s definition as ‘that which happens on its own’: autonomously – 
“what happens by itself out of necessity, its own internal necessity” – or heteronomously 
– “what happens by itself…by accident or chance” (Malabou, FH 160). Plasticity – thus 
Being, matter, life – is without prescription or purpose, it is only possibility. Yet despite 
the affirmative valences that seem to inflect possibility in most theoretical discourse, 
plasticity and possibility are not inherently progressive or positive. Possibility is equally 
as monstrous as it is beautiful because, as possibility, it promises nothing but a future, 
that something will happen. Possibility, this future, is, as Malabou described it, 
characterized by the existential temporality of voir venir, to see (what is) coming. One 
sees without seeing. You know only that something will happen, but not what; you will 
simply be shaped by accidents you did not see coming, and, in turn, respond, shaping 
them and yourself in return. “A lifetime always proceeds”, then, for Malabou, in the 
terminal rhythmic unfolding, the ontological seesaw between the “boundaries of a double 
excess: an excess of reification and an excess of fluidification” (PDW 81). Matter 
contracts, stabilizes, congeals, presents itself, transforms, changes, which is to say, 
withers or reforms or deforms. All plasticity designates is matter's possibility: the 
possibility to change, stay the same or explode; being changes, is mutable, characterized 
by a purely indifferent movement of reformation and formation of the real or matter 
itself. This is the ontological basis of the vision of Malabou’s immanent new materialism 
of which plasticity is required as its condition of possibility and intelligibility. With 
plasticity, Malabou discovers the requisite ontological principle adequate to characterize 
her immanent vision of being qua being that requires no reliance or admittance of any 
exteriority or outside because the capacities for non-determination and transformation are 
sublated within, seen to be immanent or internal to, materiality, being and the real itself. 
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1.4 Neuroplasticity as Expression of the Ontological Real 
 
Having established the philosophical bases for her new materialism through the 
elaboration of an ontological account of plasticity – plasticity as immanent Being’s 
universal capacity to give, receive and annihilate form – Malabou moves in the next 
phase of her project to determine the extent to which plasticity expresses itself in the 
materiality of the subject. Malabou seeks to provide the necessary account of what 
subject inhabits this ontological real of plasticity; that is, if the real, being or materiality 
is to be conceived as such, what evidence is there that the subject that inhabits this closed, 
immanent economy of being reflects, refracts or exhibits the same nature as this 
ontological plasticity? Here, Malabou’s itinerary takes its most recognized and 
idiosyncratic turn towards an explicit engagement with neuroscience and cerebral 
plasticity as the grounds for continuing her materialist ontology of plasticity. Again, one 
may be justified in evincing a certain incredulity towards the synthesis of these rather 
outwardly disparate orientations: what does a materialist ontology, conceived through 
Hegel and Heidegger, belonging to the tradition of antiscientific continental philosophy, 
have to do with neurosciences? Malabou, again, quite self-conscious of possible 
suspicions regarding her apparent eclecticism, admits: 
neurobiology and Hegelian philosophy may seem very remote at first sight. [But] 
in fact, the concept of “plasticity”, which plays a major role within both of them, 
has the same meaning: it characterizes a certain kind of organization, the system’s 
one. Between the system of absolute knowledge or of absolute subjectivity in 
Hegel and the nervous system in neurobiology, the difference is not so dramatic. 
It is the same mode of being, the same functioning, the same 
economy…(Malabou, “CWM” 6; emphasis mine). 
Again, in WB, she preempts readers who would look askance at her foray into 
neuroscientific literature writing: “Speaking for myself, I would say that I have been 
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interested for a long time in plasticity, whose genesis and whose meaning in the 
philosophical tradition I have, in previous efforts, attempted to elucidate and reconstitute” 
(Malabou 14). For Malabou, what “unifies the self-organization of subjectivity (Hegel’s 
temporization), the economy of ontological exchangeability (Heidegger’s transformation) 
and the constitution of momentary, always metamorphosable, always transformable 
configurations, which constitute the architecture of thought (the synaptic organization)” 
is exactly this “plastic bond” (PDW 61). What Malabou detects in neuroscience’s account 
of cerebral plasticity is the elaboration of a “regime of systematic self-organization that is 
based on the ability of an organism to integrate the modifications that it experiences and 
to modify them in return” (PDW 61) – a characterization entirely consonant with her 
account of ontological plasticity in Hegel and Heidegger. Indeed, Malabou’s engagement 
with the neurosciences serves to further confirm her postulation of plasticity as the 
fundamental ontological of Being as such. Malabou writes: “[my] study of neuronal 
plasticity and cerebral functioning…have been a true test as well as a confirmation, a 
renewal and concretization of the philosophical meaning of plasticity. The critical 
epistemological exercise carried out in [WB] thus presents itself as an enterprise of 
rectification and sharpening of the usage of this concept” (WB 14). Malabou’s works WB, 
NW and OA thus comprise explications of how the material base of the subject – the brain 
– exhibits the same plastic economy of the giving, reception and annihilation of form that 
she develops in her ontologically oriented philosophical elaborations of Hegel and 
Heidegger; neuronal plasticity, for Malabou, is an expression of the more fundamental 
plastic economy of being itself. Like the dialectical system of Hegel and the ontological 
economy of Heidegger, Malabou argues that the brain is a closed form of self-
organization, a dynamic structure that is not articulated once and for all – a genetically 
predetermined or programmed brain, a system or structure without a future, surprise or 
transformation – but one that consistently articulates itself, that both gives itself and 
receives form, seesawing between passivity and activity, formation and reformation, 
constancy and change, homeostasis and self-generation, sedimentation and explosion. In 
the same way that Hegel and Heidegger, in Malabou’s reading, untether structure, system 
and economy from any transcendent necessity or reductionism, Malabou contends that 
contemporary neuroscience emancipates the brain from claims of reductionism or 
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determinism by proving and affirming the brain’s inherent plasticity: the fact that the 
brain is a form that undergoes and creates its own change, that transforms itself over and 
through time in a dialectical play between it and its environs.  
Malabou’s WB addresses the constructive or positive nature of plasticity: the capacity for 
the brain to actively transform itself. In contrast to more traditional conceptions of the 
brain as a rigidly determined organ, Malabou draws from contemporary neuroscience to 
explicate the brain as an essentially processual and open entity, a contradictory economy 
that moves, in its terminal lifespan, between various constitutive moments of 
determination and indetermination. Again, Malabou illustrates her understanding of the 
brain through the analogy of sculpture. Each brain, Malabou argues, begins as a kind of 
Hegelian universal – a “proto-self” that is a relatively indeterminate substantial form or 
template (WB 21) which everyone shares, comprised of basic developmental synaptic 
networks in place through evolutionary genetics – which is successively shaped and 
formed through plastic modulational capacities by this brain’s particularized history – the 
constitution of a “core-self” composed of the contingent situation or socio-historical and 
cultural matrices one is ‘thrown’ into – leading to the processual sculpturing of a 
singularized self – the “auto-biographical self” which consists in the sculptural reflective 
process of the rejection or appropriation of these inherited norms and a concomitant 
project of fashioning new ones. Thus, Malabou argues, “even if all human brains 
resemble each other with respect to their anatomy, no two brains are identical with 
respect to their history…our brain is essentially…what we do with it” (WB 24, 30). 
Because the brain is what we do with it, Malabou thus petitions, in a neurobiological 
permutation of Marx, for “an awakening of the consciousness of the brain”, that is, of the 
neurological real of the brain’s plasticity, “a comprehension of the transition from the 
neuronal to the mental, a comprehension of cerebral change” (WB 66). At stake, for 
Malabou, in these discourses of neuroscientific plasticity is precisely a kind of epistemo-
ontological validation of the actuality of freedom:  
If we do not think through…this plasticity, we dodge the most important question, 
which is that of freedom. If, in effect, the life of the brain is played out between 
program and deprogramming, between determinism and the possibility of 
41 
 
changing difference, then the transition from the proto-self to the self is indeed the 
transition from the undifferentiated to the possibility of a transdifferentiation of 
self – the self, between receiving and giving form, being at once what one inherits 
and what one has created (WB 69). 
The contemporary confirmation of “brain plasticity constitutes a possible margin of 
improvisation with regard to genetic necessity” (Malabou, WB 7) providing perhaps 
evidence that ossified bifurcations between agency/structure, freedom/determinism, 
spirit/matter or anti-reductionism/reductionism are no longer adequate paradigms through 
which to address the subject because these dichotomies can no longer be treated, in good 
faith, as stable independent options, but only dialectically related moments; any affirmed 
division between the two is chimeric and outmoded. The discoveries of neuroplasticity 
indeed evince an affinity with, or perhaps even vindicate, a Hegelian reading of 
subjectivity based on dialectical negation as they affirm that a literal dialectic exists as 
the motor of change at the level of biological matter:  
[t]he dialectical nature of identity is rooted in the very nature of identity, that is to 
say, in its biological foundation…structured by the dialectical play of the 
emergence and annihilation of form…the historico-cultural fashioning of the self 
is possible only by virtue of this primary and natural economy of contradiction 
(WB 72) 
Continuing further: “Thus the transition from a purely biological entity to a mental entity 
takes place in the struggle of the one against the other, producing the truth of their 
relation. Thought is therefore nothing but nature, but a negated nature, marked by its own 
difference from itself” (Malabou, WB 81).  It is this aspect of resistance or negation at the 
level of matter itself which opens up the space for improvisation or freedom in lieu of 
synaptic determination. Again, remembering Malabou’s refutation of all transcendents, 
neuroplasticity confirms a closed system – the brain – that does not require, for freedom, 
difference or change, a transcendent subject that would activate it from an exterior, stable 
referent point, but immanently contains its own capacity for transdifferentiation and self-
determination. In this, the functioning contradictory economy of the brain – a self-
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sculpturing and sculpted open project – expresses the ontological real of the plasticity of 
being qua being.  
The petition to recognize one’s own plastic capacity for transformation does not, 
however, strictly pertain to the individual level. There is a fundamental socio-political 
register to Malabou’s argument for an awakening of a consciousness of the plasticity of 
the brain. Malabou identifies the import of plasticity to the socio-political as such: the 
truth is that the brain – and thus we ourselves, and, implicitly, our social organizations 
and our world, the finite materiality of which we and all our horizons are composed – is 
plastic but the problem is that the truth of this ontological and neurological real is 
occluded as we are made to think that we are, in her language, merely flexible. This 
dyadic opposition is the axis upon which Malabou’s text choreographically swings: 
plasticity versus flexibility. The neurological and ontological real is plastic – form is 
capable of active transformation without pre-preprogrammed, teleological necessity or 
determination – but this truth is consistently obfuscated or concealed through the 
ideological avatar of flexibility, the idea that there are certain given, natural parameters – 
a transcendentalization of structure – to which we can only reactively acquiesce, accede 
or adapt. Here, Malabou reprises her analysis of the obfuscatory logics of metaphysics 
and capitalism which present themselves as fixed, natural or necessary: the law of 
flexibility is a permutation of this logic of exemption in that there is a 
transcedentalization of form or structure that encourages the notion that we can only 
comport ourselves in accordance with the possibilities inscribed within and prescribed by 
the given situation; we do not countenance that the form or structure itself can change – a 
change of form or system is itself structurally prohibited by the metaphysic of flexibility 
because form or system are naturalized, transcendentalized, exempted from the economy 
of change itself. Malabou here sets to expose the manner in which discourses of 
neuroscience and socio-political and economic organization (for all intents and purposes, 
capitalism) mutually buttress one another in a feedback loop of reciprocal naturalization. 
To this end, Malabou writes:  
It is therefore inevitable that at the horizon of the objective descriptions of brain 
plasticity stand questions concerning social life and being together. To expedite 
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matters let us reduce these to one option: Does brain plasticity, taken as a model, 
allow us to think a multiplicity of interactions in which the participants exercise 
transformative effects on one another through the demands of recognition, of non-
domination, and of liberty? Or must we claim, on the contrary, that, between 
determinism and polyvalence, brain plasticity constitutes the biological 
justification of a type of economic, political, and social organization in which all 
that matters is the result of action as such: efficacy, adaptability – unfailing 
flexibility?” (WB 31) 
Malabou’s entreaty “to ask ‘what should we do with our brain?’” (WB 79), then, is not 
merely a call for atomistic or personal self-fashioning, but is a solicitation to re-engage a 
sense of collective responsibility in designating the question as one of ‘we’. The question 
is not, as it is in so many different instances of self-help literature, what can you do with 
your brain to become more efficient, productive or happy, but is precisely what should we 
do with our brain: in the sense of Hegelian Geist, what should we do with our shared, 
collective brain when we realize what it can do, that is, when we realize our plastic 
possibility? To pose the question of ‘what should we do with our brain’ is to admit the 
possibility of actively constructing this sense of a ‘we’, a ‘we’ that has been systemically 
eradicated in the atomistic fragmentation of neoliberal democracy. Claiming ‘what 
should we do with our brain?’ as a genuine question,  
is above all to visualize the possibility of saying no to an afflicting, economic, 
political and mediatic culture that celebrates only the triumph of flexibility, 
blessing obedient individuals who have no greater merit than that of knowing how 
to bow their heads with a smile (WB 79) 
What is the minimal response to this question for Malabou? We should refuse to treat the 
present as the index and exhaustion of the possible, that is, we should resist flexibility 
and realize our plasticity: “Not to replicate the caricature of the world: this is what we 
should do with our brain” (WB 78).  
Whereas WB is concerned with articulating the positive or constructive nature of 
plasticity and its possibility for emancipatory change, Malabou’s two subsequent works 
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engaging neuroscience – NW and OA – address the darker, aleatory and indifferent side 
of plasticity, what Malabou names destructive plasticity. Malabou pursues the elaboration 
of this negative side of plasticity out of an identification of the overly curative or 
compensatory nature of plasticity’s characterization in critical and scientific literature 
(NW 200). “In science, medicine, art, and education”, Malabou observes, 
the connotations of the term ‘plasticity’ are always positive. Plasticity refers to an 
equilibrium between the receiving and giving of form. It is understood as a sort of 
natural sculpting that forms our identity, an identity modeled by experience and 
that makes us subjects of a history, a singular, recognizable, identifiable history, 
with all its events, gaps, and future (OA 3) 
What remains lacking in these accounts of plasticity, and thus, of the ontological real of 
matter, for Malabou, is the no less possible manifestation of plasticity’s power to 
interrupt without reprieve or purpose, to indifferently destroy without an inkling of 
discretion. While unexpected encounters are typically framed fortuitously (especially 
within the discourse of academic theory) as moments which engender the possibility of 
the new, the unforeseen, of change, there is a tendency to normatively render these 
moments as intrinsically positive: change or the new is good in itself. This fervency for 
the rupture which begets the new is a fetishization. Destructive plasticity, the accidents 
we did not see coming but must suffer anyway, are typically domesticated as aberrations: 
they are deviations from the normal course of things and, as such, in their anomalous 
occurrence, can be quarantined and contained. However, there is no such thing as an 
aberration, ontologically speaking, if there is no natural order to violate or a transcendent 
metric against which to measure. The accident is as much essentially part of being as 
anything else. In regards to the plasticity of matter, of being as such, there is no reason 
why one’s loved one should not be stricken by Alzheimer’s, a hemorrhage, a lesion that 
definitively cuts into one’s biographical life. The power of destructive plasticity is 
matter’s immanent capacity of a “power of change without redemption, without 
teleology, without any meaning other than strangeness” (Malabou, OA 24). The problem 
here, for Malabou, is precisely the way that the meaningless accident is framed as a 
purely external, contingent effraction and not as a ceaseless properly immanent 
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“existential potential [of] the subject” itself (OA 30). The failure of existing accounts of 
plasticity is that: 
The possibility of an identity change by destruction, the possibility of an 
annihilating metamorphosis, does not appear as constant virtuality of being, 
inscribed in it as an eventuality, understood within its biological and ontological 
fate. Destruction remains an accident while really, to make a pun that suggests 
that the accident is a property of the species, destruction should be seen as a 
species of the accident, so that the ability to transform oneself under the effect of 
destruction is a possibility, an existential structure…[a]n identity change is not 
only the consequence of an external event, arising from pure chance, affecting and 
altering an originally stable identity. Normal identity is changeable and 
transformable entity right from the start, always liable to make a faux bond or to 
say farewell it itself (Malabou, OA 30-1) 
What is occluded in conventional renderings of plasticity in its curative and 
compensatory capacities, is the no loss prominent valence of the very real possibility of 
absolute destitution – the annihilation or destruction of form – at any given moment 
bereft of etiology or sense. The possibility of this complete destitution is again not 
anomalous but a positive ontological condition on account of the materiality of the 
subject:  
The destructive event – whether it is of biological or sociopolitical origin – causes 
irreversible transformations of the emotional brain, and thus of a radical 
metamorphosis of identity, emerges as a constant existential possibility that 
threatens each of us at every moment (Malabou, NW 213). 
What Malabou proposes is a rethinking of the ontology of the accident: that, like her 
sublation of transcendent properties into the immanence of matter, one must likewise 
introduce the existence of pure contingency, of the accident, as an internal, essential facet 
of matter itself. The accident is not an aberration of but a natural expression of matter’s 
own potentiality, its plasticity: possibility, construed properly, does not admit just a 
“good” possibility but equally must admit the equivalent ontological possibility of that 
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which is monstrous; the lesion, the onset of Alzheimer’s, the natural catastrophe, the 
violence of matter’s gambits of indiscriminate contingency. Nothing is sacrosanct and all 
is permitted. Malabou’s insistence upon the actuality of destructive plasticity is tied, 
again, to her over-arching refutation of the transcendent. If there is legitimately no 
admitted transcendent order, no absolute manner in which things are ‘supposed to be’, 
one cannot refuse to concede the ontological propriety of the accidental and aleatory as 
essential, natural elements of the movement of the plasticity of being qua being. Indeed, 
the discomfiting truth which Malabou pushes the reader to reconcile is that “destruction 
too is formative. A smashed-up face is still a face, a stump a limb, a traumatized psyche 
remains a psyche. Destruction has its own sculpting tools” (OA 4). These are not 
ontological deviations or aberrations but only transformations, only metamorphoses of 
form – plasticity, as ontological, is without prescription, purpose or any inherent 
normativity. If one follows Malabou’s line of reasoning to the logical end, even the 
common apocalyptic omen of the ‘world ending’ is unintelligible, a case of wishful 
thinking tethered to an idea of something like a ‘world’ actually substantially existing. 
The world ‘ending’ means nothing but another transformation as “a smashed-up face is 
still a face, a stump a limb”, a decimated earth is still, after its destruction, a form that 
will have its own shape: albeit one we do not recognize. The cruelty of Malabou’s 
materialist vision here, then, comes in debilitating relief. The affirmation of the existence 
of destructive plasticity – the irruption of a negativity without sublation – is to coldly 
accept the fact that the Real or Being, in its aleatory and indifferent nature, fundamentally 
resists any legitimate hermeneutical recuperation: it is the death of any narrative into 
which a meaning that would resist its own de(con)struction could be woven or stitched. 
The truth of ontological being, as plasticity, is that things just can change: for the better 
or for the worse, can stay the same or not. It makes absolutely no difference to anything. 
Malabou’s thinking of plasticity leads us here: a sheer vacancy of purpose that presses 
upon us in its unbearable saturation. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Habit 
 
From now on we can no longer have anything to do with things other than our 
own habits…Thought’s very life depends on its power to awaken that vital energy 
which always tends to mortify itself, to become sedimented into fixed and rigid 
positions. The outcome that will follow depends on this awakening: thought has 
nothing to do but wait for the habitués to look at their habits – Malabou, FH 190 
This chapter continues the argument developed in the last section concerning the 
ontological status of plasticity and the requisite need for an elaborated theory of 
embodied material activity that is commensurate with Malabou’s plastic ontology, which 
I submit is found in the concept of habit. If the nature of material being is plastic, this 
means that all of finite being is a malleable substance whose essence is its lack of 
essence, meaning, that it is without an inherently absolute or transcendent telos, purpose, 
or any preformational design whatsoever: it is a matter of construction, constitution, and 
fashioning. As such, habit becomes critical to thinking a materialist theory of subjectivity 
immanent to the ontological real Malabou describes. Plasticity is the condition of 
possibility for the existence of habit and habit is the phenomenon through which 
materiality, because of its plasticity, is shaped and formed. What connects habit to 
plasticity, Malabou argues, is Hegel’s announcement of habit as ‘a work of art of the 
soul’ (FH 25) – it is the sculpting – both passively by internal and external forces and 
actively by one’s own direction – of the material substance of the subject and its world. 
Habit, Malabou reads from Hegel, is this constitutive work of self-formation that 
transforms one’s biological first nature into a historically or experientially fashioned or 
sculpted ‘second nature’ that becomes the singularized self or subject. Indeed, Malabou 
goes so far as to say that habit is synonymous with ‘second nature’ and therefore, since 
there is decisively no longer any substantial first nature in the ontological framework of 
Malabou elaborated here – as we remember from Malabou’s reading of Heidegger 
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concerning the ontological anteriority of fashioning over essence: any form, materiality 
or presence entails a more originary entry or transformation into form, materiality or 
presence – habit, or ‘second nature’, becomes of vital importance in the constitution of 
subjectivity and the world in which we inhabit; there is nothing outside of the 
maintenance, creation or destruction of habits, as there are only ever ‘second’ natures. In 
this way, Malabou’s materialism affirms in unison with Gilles Deleuze that “[w]e are 
habits, nothing but habits – the habit of saying ‘I’” (Empiricism and Subjectivity x)26 
when she writes that “[f]rom now on we can no longer have anything to do with things 
other than our own habits” (FH 190) as that is all of which that we are composed.  
This chapter will proceed by first adducing Malabou’s discussion of habit in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Mind, drawn from her first work FH. In elaborating Malabou’s account, I 
will gesture to how this explication of habit – particularly the dialectical interplay 
between the Hegelian terms of universal, particular and singular – is consistent with 
Malabou’s reading of the neurological constitution of identity – the dialectical move from 
the ‘neuronal’ to the ‘mental’ – elaborated in WB Following from this, I contend that 
Malabou insufficiently emphasizes the centrality of habit to the intelligibility of her 
philosophical project as ontological plasticity requires a practical expression, a way of 
putting plasticity ‘to work’, in order for it to have the critical import she envisages. I will 
then expand and supplement Malabou’s account of habit, then, in two ways. First, I 
identify a missed opportunity for Malabou to emphasize the socio-political, and not just 
                                                 
26The ‘self’, ‘subject’ or ‘I’ is a habit in so far as it is a dynamic equilibrium between preservation and 
change, sedimentation and fluidification, formation and deformation in a processual state of sculpturing or 
construction which is, simultaneously, an interminable undoing and deconstruction: a habit is something 
which lacks a substantive or preformed identity or essence, the essence of the subject and world of habit 
being its lack of essence. The difference to be marked from a broadly Deleuzian conception of habit is that 
the subject envisaged by Malabou, through Hegel and Heidegger, is one that can intervene or ‘get on top 
of’ and reflectively participate in the formation of its material bases – it is not purely subjected to or 
determined by a transcendental field of singularities or a virtual flux of Being that one subscribes to in 
endorsing the Neo-Spinozism of Deleuze. Nor is the subject of habit construed through Malabou a purely 
independent entity that emerges from its material bases and achieves full autonomy as one finds in the Neo-
Hegelianisms of Adrian Johnston and Slavoj Žižek. Malabou, like her reading of plasticity, situates itself in 
the middle of these two extremes as the self is initially constituted by and always susceptible to forces it 
cannot control (the determinism of substance found in Deleuzian Neo-Spinozisms) but is also 
simultaneously capable of concerted self-formation and participating in the construction of its world (the 
agency of the subject emphasized in contemporary Neo-Hegelianisms). 
50 
 
ontological-individual, importance of habit by transposing her analysis of ontological-
individual habit in Philosophy of Mind to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in where habit 
plays a critical role in the constitution of ethical or shared socio-political life. By 
redoubling Malabou’s reading of habit in the Philosophy of Mind to the Philosophy of 
Right – and, as I indicated above, illustrating the correspondences with her elaboration of 
neuroplasticity – I will illustrate the important, wider socio-political implications of 
Malabou’s thinking to be drawn out of her thought especially with regards to the ‘brain’ 
as a metaphor for thinking through the construction of shared socio-political life. 
Secondly, I propose that Malabou fails to explore the crucial similarities between the 
operation of gewohnheit [habit] in Hegel and geworfenheit [thrownness] in Heidegger, 
missing an opportunity to bolster, validate and significantly enrich her rapprochement 
between the two figures. By reading Hegel and Heidegger together, a shared vision of an 
immanent, groundless subject emerges whose existence is a matter of habitual 
construction. Attendant to this, the novel, and, I argue, contemporaneously important, 
connection of the specifically epistemic role of affect in each thinker’s account of habit 
will be put in relief. Lastly, I will argue that Malabou’s concept of plasticity, 
supplemented by the reading of habit I perform, helpfully negotiates between the 
impasses between the two dominant camps of materialism and their attendant political 
prescriptions for transformation: Deleuzian reformist micropolitics and Neo-Hegelian 
(Badiou, Žižek and Johnston) revolutionary macropolitics.  
 
2.1 Habit as the Sculpting of Plasticity 
 
The problem with an ontology of plasticity is the problem one faces with all ontological 
claims: ontological claims cannot legitimately make any intrinsic positive claim to the 
way things should be, but rather seek to ascertain and articulate how things are. Ontology 
is the study of Being, the nature of what and how things exist. Malabou’s project to 
elaborate an immanent new materialism grounded in the principle of plasticity, is, at base, 
as I demonstrate in the first chapter, such an ontological venture. We must be clear, then, 
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about what plasticity precisely means and demarcate its legitimate purview. As Malabou 
expressly states plasticity is not a quality of Being – something that could be substituted 
out, a garment to be taken off, hung on a chair, something it could at some time not be – 
it is the essence of Being as such: “Being is nothing but its plasticity” (Malabou, PDW 
36). This formulation of equivalence is unequivocal. To reiterate again, then, what 
plasticity is: plasticity designates the giving, reception and annihilation of form. Being is 
nothing but its plasticity, means, then, that Being is nothing but the giving, reception and 
annihilation of form (that is, of matter). Malabou writes:  
Existence reveals itself as plasticity, as the very material of presence, as marble is 
the material of sculpture. It is capable of receiving any kind of form, but it also 
has the power to give form itself. Being the stuff of things, it has the power to 
both shape and to dissolve…(PDW 81) 
Existence, as plasticity, then reveals itself simply as a malleable substance that can form 
itself (nonorganic matter possesses its own active agency) and be formed in equal 
capacity (is passive and receptive as well). Plasticity is rendered, in Malabou’s 
formulation above, equivalent to marble: it is the ‘material of presence’ to be sculpted. 
Remember that this material ‘presence’ is not substantial or essential in the traditional 
metaphysical sense: it does not designate an absolute foundation. As Malabou’s reading 
of Heidegger makes clear, every form, every instantiation of being, of presence as such, 
is always already (ex)changed: every form, every instantiation of being, every instance of 
presence is always already an entry into form, being or presence. There is an ontological 
anteriority of fashioning – change, transformation, mutability – over that of metaphysical 
essence and, as such, there is nothing that cannot be changed again: the accidental and the 
essential or contingency and necessity are here rendered strictly equiprimordial. Plasticity 
thus names, ontologically, the change of this originary change: the contradictory 
economy of matter comprised of the giving, receiving and annihilating itself in the 
absence of a first substantive ‘nature’. Being, existence, form, materiality – the litany of 
designations under which Malabou names this presence of life – is simply only the 
capacity to change, stay the same or not: this is the systemic law of the deconstructed – 
that is, the disclosed as ateleological and contingent – real. In this way, plasticity, as 
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being, as the Real, as matter merely (ex)changing itself in a senseless seesaw of 
formation, reformation and destruction, prescribes and promises nothing. It merely 
provides an ontological argument for contingency and possibility: as Malabou writes, 
simply, “it could have been otherwise, it could not have been otherwise” (FH 163). The 
primary import of plasticity, then, cannot, in a strict sense, be identified as positive – it 
cannot and does not prescribe any activity as it designates merely ontological possibility 
as the malleable substance of existence, which is not inherently progressive or good in 
itself – but is restricted rather to a largely negative function in that it provides an 
ontological bulwark against any claims made to transcendent necessity as such. As 
Malabou writes, “[w]hen identity tends towards reification, the congealing of form, one 
can become victim of highly rigid frameworks whose temporal solidification produces 
the appearance of unmalleable substance” (Malabou, PDW 81). In the event that we 
become victim to frameworks that acquire “the appearance of unmalleable substance” 
(ibid.) - such as the contemporary appearance of the absolute naturalization of late 
capitalism – the ontological real of plasticity invalidates, in principle, any such purported 
metaphysical necessity, irreversible solidification or complete naturalization. However, 
again, this is merely ‘the awakening of consciousness of plasticity’ that Malabou 
petitions for in WB: while serving an important negative function, it does not provide a 
requisite positive corollary for subjective enactment. The question, posed in Heideggerian 
terms, is: if plasticity is ontological Being, how does plasticity manifest or express itself 
ontically? That is, how do we use our plasticity, how do we use the malleable material of 
presence, as marble is the material of sculpture? In Hegelian terms, how do we make our 
consciousness of plasticity not just in-itself but for-itself? To formulate the question as 
such leads one into an impasse: to exhort one to ‘use’ their plasticity is tantamount to 
saying that one should ‘use’ their Being, use their plastic ‘marble’. But you always 
already are plastic: it is merely the movement of matter into different forms. To say, 
then, that we need to ‘use’ our plasticity thus seems conceptually empty if one follow’s 
Malabou’s argument to this logical end; to ‘use’ plasticity is, in a sense, unintelligible as 
it merely constitutes, as Malabou identifies, the materiality of which life is composed. 
Plasticity thus requires a commensurate mode of expression, a manner in which it can be 
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embodied and used. How does plasticity manifest itself in the subject and how does one 
put plasticity to work?  
Plasticity is put to work in the realm of the subject and the world through the 
phenomenon of habit. Habit is the material manifestation of plasticity, comprising a 
commensurate modality of embodied activity that exhibits plasticity’s double valences of 
the passivity and activity of form. Habit entails, at once, the passivity of reception – one 
is formed by and through habits unconsciously – and the activity of formation – habits 
are inculcated through both conscious and unconscious repetition and practice – 
circumventing the traditional deadlock of binary thinking through conceding the 
constitutive dialectical interplay between both passivity and activity in constituting the 
subject and world. Malabou describes habit as “the plastic operation which makes the 
body into an instrument” (FH 38): habit is the instrument which performs the sculpting of 
plastic material into its forms, it is the “work of art of the soul” (FH 25). It is the manner 
through which the indeterminate and undifferentiated substance of plastic material is 
progressively sculpted into a differentiated and determinate form: “[h]abit’s contribution 
to the work of formation and culture is…analogous to the moulding gesture of the 
sculptor” (Malabou, FH 68). In FH, Malabou argues for the fundamental role that habit 
plays for Hegel’s thinking of subjectivity by performing a reading of the “Anthropology” 
section in Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind. Here, habit plays a decisive role in the transition 
from universal substance (marble) to singularized subject (sculpted marble), being the 
operation through which the body and soul, in dialectical interplay, sublate their 
perceived externality and come to be at home with one another “as the sensuous medium 
of spirit” (Malabou, FH 73).  
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2.2 Habit in Philosophy of Mind: Passive Reception of Form 
in the Habituation of the Body 
 
The Philosophy of Mind, in which Hegel’s discussion of habit is found, is the third 
installment of Hegel’s encyclopedia, following the Philosophy of Nature. The Philosophy 
of Mind, divided into Subjective and Objective Spirit, thus seeks to trace the manner in 
which the human mind develops immanently out of nature itself. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom regarding Hegel – the ‘idealist’ par excellence of ethereal spirit and 
disembodied rationality – the Philosophy of Mind proffers a highly materialist, affective 
account of the process by which the individual comes to be, in an important phrase for 
Hegel, aware and at home in its own body by tracing the development whereby 
consciousness emerges from embodied sensations or feelings (PM §410, 144). Hegel 
emphasizes the pre-reflective processes – the contraction of habits – prior to reflective, 
intentional consciousness by which the body develops affective, physiological and 
cognitive habits that permit the body to attain the functional homeostasis required to be 
an operative, embodied individual. Hegel’s conception of the genesis of subjectivity and 
reason is not the story of an independent, disembodied or ethereal mind which activates a 
pre-formed container of a body but is far more attentive than usually credited to the 
emotional and affective components of physiological experience that necessarily 
precursor our capacity for intentional consciousness and rational reflection. For Hegel, 
“Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will, everything that emerges in conscious 
intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation” (PM §400). That is, the 
subject emerges out of an ontogenetic process of which it is equally a product as much as 
it is producer; first being the former, and then coming to retroactively become the latter.  
The trajectory of the “Anthropology” in the Subjective Spirit division of the Philosophy 
of Mind consists in tracing the development of the self via its gradual habituation to its 
own body to the point at which conscious reflections and individuality proper emerges. 
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Hegel begins with what he calls the Natural Soul. The Natural Soul comprises the 
“universal substance” – in the sculptural analogy of Malabou, the piece of marble – that 
each individual inherits and which becomes the subsequent material basis of all 
individual sculpturing and formation (Hegel, PM §391). Enfolded within the designation 
of the Natural Soul are all those determinations that constitute the indeterminacy of the 
self’s ground, those contingent but necessary aspects of one’s life that one must take up 
but did not choose such as geography, nationality, ethnicity. Hegel also identifies, as 
falling under the purview of the Natural Soul, congenital elements such as talent, 
temperament and character. This stage corresponds precisely to what Malabou designates 
in WB as the ‘neuronal’ or ‘proto-self’: the, in a word, ‘hardware’ that one is born with in 
regards to genetic inheritances and determinations. As Malabou writes:  
although Hegel could not yet express himself in the idiom of the ‘neuronal’ and 
the ‘mental’, his constant preoccupation was the transformation of the mind’s 
natural existence (the brain, which he still calls the ‘natural soul’) into its 
historical and speculative being (WB 81) 
We can here, then, for Malabou, directly correlate what Hegel designates the ‘Natural 
Soul’ with the brain, particular the ‘neuronal’ brain or ‘proto-self’, as they operate in a 
structurally homologous manner in the constitution of the subject. The Natural Soul 
comprises the equivalent of the biological brain at the moment of the neuronal ‘proto-
self’ – the subjectively unsculpted but objectively endowed material that will constitute 
the basis of the self – prior to the subject’s own concerted activity and self-formation in 
the emergence of the properly ‘mental’ brain or ‘core’ and ‘autobiographical self’ (the 
historical, cultural and reflective dimensions of the subject).   
The next moment in the emergence of the subject is what Hegel calls ‘The Feeling Soul’ 
which moves through the triadic moments of universal-particular-individual/singular 
(these last two can be used interchangeably): the feeling soul in its immediacy 
(universal), self-feeling (particular) and, finally, habit (individual). The feeling soul in its 
immediacy could be described as the subject being “in itself” and not yet “for itself”, still 
in “darkness” (Hegel, PM §404) as an “infinite treasury of sensations” (Hegel, PM §403); 
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“it is…immediate, not yet as its self, not a true subject reflected into itself” (Hegel, PM 
§405). This is the human being in its sheer corporeity where the feelings and sensations 
are its mode of being – there is, as of yet, no self-differentiation. The next moment, what 
Hegel calls self-feeling, constitutes the point at which the self begins to distinguish itself 
from its feelings transitioning from the universality of feeling in its immediacy to the 
particular moment of self-feeling where the individual inchoately begins to feel that 
these feelings are its own: it is “essentially the tendency to distinguish itself in itself, and 
to wake up to the judgment in itself, in virtue of which it has particular feelings and 
stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself” (Hegel, PM §407). This is a 
moment of diremption in the self. For example, a child who feels hunger cries out as this 
feeling stands over and against them as something intrusive or alien: the child does not 
countenance that this feeling of hunger is something that is part of its being, but feels as if 
it is something which is hostile to it and over which it has no control. The child 
involuntarily responds to this feeling and his whole being is consumed by this feelings of 
hunger until it is fulfilled – there is no expectation – which would be born of habit – that 
it will soon satiated in the future. The same can be said for learning how to walk or 
speak: the inability to perform these tasks is something which frustrates the neophyte 
because they are not part of, in Hegel’s language, the self’s ‘essential’ being; they are 
contingent and accidental, outside of the self. In this moment of development the 
individual essentially experiences its body and attendant passions, ideas, inclinations, 
capacities as externalities which it is subject to instead of conceptualizing it as part of its 
being; the subject, here, at the level of the particularity of self-feeling, the self, is 
alienated from itself.  
The next stage, that of habit, is the corrective to this moment being the plastic operation 
through which the subject, through a sculptural process of practice and repetition, comes 
to integrate these accidents, contingencies or particularities as features of its own self 
through a process of habituation by which the self internalizes these different externalities 
and comes to be individuated and at home in them. The depiction of habit, in Hegel, is a 
double moment, involving the two dominant aspects of plasticity: the passive reception of 
form and the active donation or reformation of form. As Malabou observes, “in the 
etymology of the word habit we discover the Latin word habere: habit is a way of 
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‘having’, and in this sense, a kind of possession, a property” (FH 37). Habit then 
describes the process of ‘making one’s own’, of coming ‘to have’ which creates a 
particular way of being (Malabou, FH 37): the concerted construction and maintenance 
of habits is our way of being-at-home-with-oneself and one’s world (Hegel, PM §410, 
144). Habit first appears as the passive phenomenon through which the body auto-
poetically forms itself by “reducing the particulars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a 
mere feature of its being” (PM §410). This is the process whereby the ‘soul’ (the brain or 
mind Malabou argues) incorporates into itself the initially alien particularities of 
sensation so it “has them and moves in them, without feeling or consciousness of the 
fact” (Hegel, PM §410)27. The emergence of the subject, for Hegel, is subtended by this 
plastic movement of the body auto-organizing itself through the contraction of habits, as 
the body’s corporeality is moulded without rational intervention or consciousness. Hegel 
offers the examples of one’s development of eyesight where the eye habituates itself to 
light and the gradual shaping of the body in the development of one’s upright posture 
(Hegel, PM §410). These pre-reflective processes arguably extend to the auto-
organization of the body itself in regards to, for instance, skin tissue, organs, the 
circulatory system and, in the case of the brain, the economy of synaptic circuitry. This 
phase of habit in the ontological constitution of the subject exemplifies the movement of 
plasticity: matter actively forms itself and the self passively acquires form, 
unconsciously, in the development of its body and bodily capacities. This originary 
activity and passivity of matter enables the self to take form and exist as in appropriating 
and internalizing these externalities of self-feeling, “the soul is freed from them, so far as 
it is not interested in or occupied with them” (Hegel, PM §410). Becoming habituated to 
– that is, at-home-in – the clamourings of its desires, needs, etc. the individual becomes 
“open to be otherwise occupied and engaged” (Hegel, PM §410). This passive phase of 
habit, through which the body habituates itself into a functioning homeostasis, creates the 
very possibility of the emergence of conscious, reflective self and concerted, creative 
                                                 
27
 Here, Hegel’s description of the process of habit in the constitution of the body anticipates Deleuze’s 
argument, found in Empiricism and Subjectivity, that it is passive rather than active syntheses – as Kant 
argues – which originally constitute the ground of the self’s individuation and being-in-the-world.  
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activity. The passive syntheses of habit “form the condition of the soul’s liberation, of its 
attaining objective consciousness” (PM §410), establishing the stability required for the 
subject to both participate in future self-directed initiatives and withstand future 
encroachments from and encounters with its external material environs. Habit is the 
activity through which the body is prepared to incorporate accidents that inevitably 
surface in the course of experience, being the “process whereby the contingent becomes 
the essential” (Malabou, FH 74): habit permits the existence of unity – the maintenance 
of the guise of the essential – in a world composed of externalities and accidents. 
Translated into the neuro-vocabulary of WB, this passive operation of habit constitutes an 
extension of the work of the ‘neuronal’ brain, being the development and modulation of 
synaptic connections and the co-ordination between the networks of the body to 
transform and adapt itself naturally, without conscious or rational direction, in response 
to certain experiences of the outside such as, for instance, things as banal as gradual 
inurement to heat or cold or habituation to feelings of discomfort or hunger.  When the 
self finally develops the capacity for reflection and intentional consciousness it enters, 
decisively, in media res of an affective, embodied, biological and synaptic life already 
very much long in the making through the unconscious work of habit. Our bodies and 
their ability to exist and consist in the world are a result of manifold repetitions, practices 
and unreflective processes – that is, a network of habits – which we do not choose to 
participate in but comprise the very conditions of possibility for being an individuated 
self.  
The appearance of the sublating work of habit – which creates and constitutes the 
material body – marks the emergence of the Actual Soul and the beginning of the 
Phenomenology of Mind section of the Encyclopedia, the abridged condensation of 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, which is then followed by the development of 
Objective Spirit. The Actual Soul – the becoming-conscious brain-body – compromises 
the point at which subject splits from substance in the immanent emergence of the 
reflective, conscious self; in the vocabulary of WB, it is the immanent emergence of the 
‘mental’ from the ‘neuronal’ or the ‘social’ from the ‘biological’ self. Here begins the 
proper starting point of habit as the ‘work of art of the soul’ as it is precisely here that the 
self is thrown into its historical and cultural situation, marking the beginning of the active 
59 
 
process of its sculpting a ‘second’ nature.  The operation through which the body came to 
be-at-home-with- itself through habit – via a dialectic of accident and essence, or 
externalization and internalization, of making what appears outside oneself one’s own – 
functions homologously in the sphere of personal experience as the self sculpts its 
essentially inherited body through historical and cultural experience, exposing itself to 
newness and difference and incorporating these encounters as essential parts of its own 
identity. Thrust into the world, the self begins its lifelong process of giving itself shape, 
both erasing and transforming its initial indeterminate shape through developing and 
acquiring variegated skills, aptitudes, predilections – one learns to play sports, board 
games, language, math problems, reading, social manners, culinary preferences – 
subjecting oneself to different experiences that progressively hew the undifferentiated 
material of one’s original ‘template’, marble or plasticity into a determinate form that 
becomes its singularized self. It is crucial to understand however, to understand both 
habit and Hegel, that this form of the self does not exist in advance of or precede its 
composition: the self is only its own process of composition. It is here, in examining the 
dialectic of habit formation in the constitution of the self, that traditional criticisms of the 
movement of Aufhebung can be shown to have missed the mark. In the dialectic, 
conventionally understood, difference is mollified or colonized in the reinternalization of 
this contradiction in the reassertion of a previous substantial identity. While it is clear in 
the movement of habit formation that externalities are indeed reabsorbed, ‘made one’s 
own’, this appropriative movement is made at the expense of a fundamental 
transformation of what constitutes the ‘essential’ or ‘identity’ itself. Whereas textbook 
readings of Hegel see difference as being violently domesticated and subsumed into a 
prefashioned and stable identity that was there in the beginning and maintains itself 
through its encounter, what these criticisms of Hegel’s ‘difference-subsuming’ miss is 
that the encounter with difference and its reincorporation performatively generates a new 
identity in this movement of this reabsorption: the self’s encounter with difference is an 
exposure of its identity to transformation. There is no return or smooth protraction of the 
same, but a folding in of the aleatory at the level of structure which changes the essential 
itself: the contraction of a habit – of making one’s own – is the performative generation 
of a new form of the self that did not pre-exist this process but was precisely generated in 
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its movement. For example, when beginning to read Hegel, I approach the body of his 
work with an immediate/universal/abstract idea of what I think Hegel ‘is’ gleaned from 
experience. In beginning to actually read his work, his thought appears as a difference or 
externality which resists my attempts to easily digest or understand his thinking – it is not 
part of me, but exists as a particularity that is separate from me. Through habituating 
myself to Hegel’s thought through repeatedly reading – making myself familiar with the 
movement of the dialectic, the language of the universal-particular-individual, the logical 
exposition of the system, etc. – I begin to incorporate Hegel’s thinking into myself, 
except, this new familiarity with Hegel is transformative: ‘I’ internalize Hegel, but 
Hegel’s thought changes the complexion of that ‘I’; it becomes ‘part’ of me, but this ‘me’ 
is in itself a difference produced in the erasure of the previous ‘me’ by this encounter. To 
return to Malabou’s illustration of habit via the analogy of sculpture, when the piece of 
marble – the self’s identity – is struck by a chisel – difference – it remains ‘itself’ but 
definitively changes form: it is not the same but it is still ‘itself’. With repeated activity 
or practice – chiseling – the shape of the self becomes more defined and ingrained: it 
becomes a habit and a determinate feature or contour of the ‘marble’ and not merely a 
fleck or a chip.  
 
 
2.3 Hegel, Heidegger and the Passive Reception of Social 
Form: Habit and World 
 
While Malabou highlights the role of habit in the ontological constitution of the 
individual, she neglects to connect her reading of habit with the homologous function that 
it plays in Hegel’s Objective Spirit, the realm of ethical or shared socio-political life. 
While this may be said to exceed the purview of her work in FH, illustrating this 
connection importantly vindicates and bolsters the purported socio-political import of her 
thinking as announced in WB To recapitulate how habit essentially functions, it is a 
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dialectic of familiarity and alienation: an externality appears over and against an 
individual, and the individual, to assuage this discomfiting split, must internalize or make 
this externality its own. This ‘making one’s own’, coming to be ‘at home’ with oneself 
and the world, is achieved through habit and the process of habituation, comprising a 
sculpting of the self into a determinate form through its encounters, activities and 
practices. In a structurally correlative manner to that of the self inheriting a body over 
which it has no initial choice in the Philosophy of Mind, the Philosophy of Right concerns 
how the self is similarly habituated or thrown into an equally unchosen matrix of external 
determinants – social, historical, cultural, political and all the intricate inter-stitching that 
these separate designations entail – which it must initially take up. Much like the role that 
habit plays as an auto-appropriative mechanism in achieving a functional homeostasis of 
the body, there is a prepared socio-ideological field that the subject necessarily enters and 
habituates itself to: it is initially a part of a social body. This process of enculturation or 
bildung functions in the same triadic syllogism as habit in the realm of subjective spirit: 
there is the universal – the indeterminate objective substance, the plastic undifferentiated 
marble of the self – which then proceeds dialectically to the particular – the initial 
inscription of the subject by ethical substance, comprised of unconscious or unchosen 
norms, values, techniques, modes and kinds of practical savoir which are solidified 
through the repetition of habitual practices – to the singular stage whereby the individual 
becomes conscious and can reflect and then choose to rationally self-determine itself in 
accordance to its own will or retroactively change what has come presently to determine 
it, i.e., the subject can begin to actively sculpt itself, objectively externalizing itself in the 
world and not just be passively moulded by exterior forces. Again, this becomes a 
movement of incorporation whereby the subject habituates – in the etymological sense of 
habit as making one’s own, possessing, appropriating – itself in regards to certain values, 
norms and practices causing them to lose their externality and become part of the 
individual, thus allowing them to move freely within them and through them as an 
expression of one’s own freedom and will and not an imposition from an ‘inauthentic’, 
alien authority. The ‘external’ world that one enters provides the determinative content of 
the human’s individuation. This determinative content is not, however, implanted or 
endowed by some deus ex machina that miraculously forms a natural, fixed essence to a 
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particular subject. The determinative content is provided by the substance of community 
into which one is thrown and which you only acquire through repeated practices or 
habits. It is in no way essential – in the sense of immutable – as it is constantly enacted 
and reaffirmed through one’s everyday, habitual activity. By conceiving of habit in this 
way, Hegel shows that the individual is in perpetual, even if infinitesimal, motion and, as 
such, is always an open project, an ateleological entity in a process of constant 
sculpturing, capable of transformation, re-shaping and new directions.  
What insisting upon the legitimacy of this redoubling of habit accomplishes is a way to 
conceptualize the import of habit for socio-political life and how to understand the 
relationship between the self and its world. Like the passive genesis of the body in PM, 
the individual is similarly habituated into the world. However, the habituation that occurs 
in PR is of a decidedly different nature than that of PM: whereas PM traces the immanent 
physiological and ontological constitution of the body and the emergence of 
consciousness (akin to Deleuze), the habits that PR is concerned with are symbolic or 
normative and regard the wider, macro-registers of Malabou’s thought that were 
discussed in Chapter One. That is, the individual is an immanent, embedded nodal point 
in a larger habitus of the closed structure or economy of Geist: a collective mind or social 
brain composed of symbolic and normative habits which both sculpt and are sculpted by 
individual activity; that is, they are habits they we ourselves make either through 
maintaining the ones we inherit or transforming them, sculpting new ones. Here, the 
dialectic of habit formation that occurs at the ontological-individual level in PM must be 
transposed scalarly to a larger dialectic of individual and world. Returning to the 
metaphor of sculpture, the world into which the individual is thrown is itself a piece of 
plastic marble that is being shaped and formed consciously or unconsciously by human 
activity. Geist, the collective mind, the social brain – whatever name one chooses – all 
constitute ‘second natures’ as they are not given or natural – even though they often 
appear to be – but are precisely the ongoing result of cultivated habits or praxis. Self-
sculpting and world-sculpting, are, then, dialectically entangled. That is, there is no 
distinction to be made between one’s own subjective life and the objective world: the 
objective world – Geist, collective mind or social structures – is only the calcification of 
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habitual practices repeatedly performed by human actors that has, through the repetition 
of these practices, achieved the appearance of naturalcy, solidity or inertia.  
The problem is that, because the objective or socio-political world we are thrown and 
habituate ourselves into, that is, become familiar or at-home-with, is precisely a ‘second 
nature’ created by habit, like habit, it effaces or obscures the contingency of its own 
grounds. One of habit’s fundamental characteristics is this amnesic quality of self-
forgetting: in becoming habitual – familiar or at home – ways of being and ways of 
thinking become inconspicuous and naturalized. Paradoxically, it is because we are 
constituted primarily of and by habits that we forget that they are habits in the first place 
and thus take them to be natural, necessary or unmalleable instead of what they are: 
fundamentally plastic habits – ways of being in, thinking about and organizing the world 
– that we ourselves can either change or maintain. Here, Hegel and Heidegger are 
proximate in their diagnosis of the relationship between the self and its world – a 
contiguity that Malabou seemingly overlooks. For all of Malabou’s sensitivity to 
etymology – her project is essentially predicated on the enlargement of the semantic field 
of plasticity to an ontological register – she curiously fails to detect or pursue the crucial 
connections between the operation of habit or Gewohnheit in Hegel and two of 
Heidegger’s most central neological constructions: being-in-the-world and Geworfenheit 
or, as its translated, thrownness. The most fundamental constitutive feature of Dasein, 
Heidegger argues, is “being-in the-world” (Heidegger, Being and Time 53/53). Heidegger 
glosses the etymology of being-in as it pertains to Dasein as such: 
‘In’ stems from innan-, to live, habitare, to dwell. ‘An’ means I am used to, 
familiar with, I take care of something. It has the meaning of colo in the sense of 
habito and diligo. We characterized this being to whom being-in belongs in this 
meaning as the being which I myself always am. The expression “bin” I 
connected with “bei.” “Ich bin” [“I am”] means I dwell, I stay near…the world as 
something familiar in such and such a way. Being as the infinitive of “I am”: that 
is, understood as an existential, means to dwell near…, to be familiar 
with…Being-in is thus the formal existential expression of the being of Dasein 
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which has the essential constitution of being-in-the-world (Heidegger, Being and 
Time 54/54-5). 
As Heidegger elaborates above, ‘being-in’ intimates a number of valences: to dwell or 
inhabit a world we are used to, familiar with, near or close with. The constitutive nature 
of Dasein as being-in is thus dwelling, dwelling in a world that is familiar, that we take 
care, that we inhabit. We could expand this etymological field by pointing out the close 
proximity of the word for ‘to dwell’ or ‘to live’, wohnen28 and the word for habit, 
gewohnheit. Gewohnheit, the word for habit, means to get used or accustomed to, to 
accustom oneself to2930. Related words gewohnlich and gewohnt both suggest normal, 
ordinary or customary, everyday life, in one’s usual manner3132. Thus, enfolded within 
the designation of Dasein’s being-in as dwelling is a robust, interconnected semantic field 
of connotations at play regarding habit and the associated valences of accustoming, the 
ordinary, the customary, ‘one’s’ usual way of living. Heidegger’s central neologism of 
geworfenheit [thrownness] thus essentially means ‘thrown habit’, designating how we are 
ineluctably thrown into habits, ways of being, that predate and exceed us. Teased out, this 
rich collection of interlinked semantic registers suggest that Dasein’s being-in-the-world 
can be, in a sense, be understood as thrown habitual dwelling; they, in Heidegger’s sense, 
equiprimordially co-implicate one another: dwelling is always thrown, and being thrown 
is always a habit and a habit (habitat, habitus) is always dwelling. Heidegger’s neologism 
                                                 
28
 “wohnen”. Oxford Duden English German Dictionary: German English. London: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. Retrieved through University of Western Ontario. Electronic Edition.  
29
 “gewohnheit”. Oxford Duden English German Dictionary: German English. London: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. Retrieved through University of Western Ontario. Electronic Edition. 
30
 Another sense of habit is that of “clothing”. When Heidegger speaks of Dasein being naked, thrown 
before itself in anxiety stripped of the familiarity of the world, one can think that, in this moment, Dasein 
has been de-habited, dis-robed of its socio-symbolic dressing (Heidegger, Being and Time 343/327) 
31
 “gewohnlich”. Oxford Duden English German Dictionary: German English. London: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. Retrieved through University of Western Ontario. Electronic Edition. 
32
 “gewohnt”. Oxford Duden English German Dictionary: German English. London: Oxford University 
Press, 2000. Retrieved through University of Western Ontario. Electronic Edition. 
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geworfenheit33 accentuates an important element of movement that is somewhat absent in 
‘habit’, capturing a vital sense of motion that is obscured by the predominant sense of 
habit as something static. Habits are continually in motion as they consist primarily of 
practices: habits only maintain their potency in being acted out, in being practiced. 
Because of their familiarity, habits attain and exude a kind of inertia, but this is only an 
outward semblance as their force is maintained only by repeated action and praxis34.  
For both Hegel and Heidegger, then, the subject or Dasein unreflectively comports itself 
in the world because, one, initially and for the most part, is always already taken over by 
the world precisely because the self or Dasein is habituated or thrown into its world. 
There is no ‘I’ that precedes its symbolic inscription; the ‘I’ is always, in Heidegger’s 
terms, thrown and thus, in a sense, inherited or bestowed: you are always already 
sculpted, there is always already a form in place. Heidegger writes, “[i]nitially, ‘I’ ‘am’ 
not in the sense of my own self, but I am the others in the mode of the they [das Man]. In 
terms of the they, and as the they, I am initially ‘given’ to ‘myself’” (Heidegger, Being 
and Time 129/125). Heidegger’s designation of das Man or ‘the they’ or ‘the one’ is 
strictly equivalent to Hegel’s notion of ethical substance. By das Man Heidegger wishes 
to designate the ‘one’, the way in which ‘one’ does things, meaning, socially normative 
practices, mores, values. Das Man or ethical substance thus designates the possibilities, 
the social habits or normative, inconspicuous ways of social being, that are pre-
circumscribed in the world into which we are thrown: they are the familiar ways of being 
that we initially must identify with and internalize to be recognized individuals at all. As 
Heidegger writes, “Dasein is the they and for the most part it remains so” (Heidegger, 
Being and Time 129/125), meaning, we, for the most of our lives, dwell in accordance to 
the habitual way that our world values, judges, thinks: “[i]f Dasein is familiar with itself 
as the they-self, this also means that the they prescribes the nearest interpretation of the 
world and of being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, Being and Time 129/125). That is, we 
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 There is perhaps something to be done with the relation of geworfenheit, gewohnheit and verworfenheit. 
Verworfenheit means abjectness, depravity.   
34
 This resembles Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept of the practico-inert outlined in Critique of Dialectical 
Reason (1960).  
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always arrive to ourselves, our field of possibilities already circumscribed, just like 
finding ourselves in the middle of an already constituted body in Hegel’s PM, in media 
res as we have always already unreflectively taken over assumptions, perspectives and 
ways of orienting ourselves to and in the world: the they, the way ‘one’ does things, our 
social habits are the conditions of possibility of our very existence. 
For Hegel and Heidegger then, one always begins from a situation of thrownness – or 
habituated dwelling – in where the world, because it is habituated, appears natural and 
necessary. We live, for the most part, in the way, in Heidegger’s excellent phrase, that 
‘one’ does things, we think the way ‘one’ thinks “without”, as Hegel writes, “moral 
consternation and without the vanity of claiming to know better” (PR §144). We simply 
act in our routine and habitual ways of being because we are at home-in-the-world and 
there is no discord between the self and its situation. However, merely acting 
mechanically in accordance with the given habits of your particular socio-historical 
situation does not, for either Hegel and Heidegger, accurately reflect the reality or true 
possibility of the individual human subject or Dasein: for Hegel, this does not comprise 
genuine ‘freedom’ and, for Heidegger, one’s entanglement in das Man constitutes 
inauthentic rather than ‘authentic’ existence. What engenders the possibility of becoming 
‘free’ or ‘authentic’ for Hegel and Heidegger is a rupturing of the tranquility of habit, the 
emergence of a feeling of not-being-at-home. As was the case in Hegel’s account of habit 
in PM, there occurs homologously in socio-political life, for Hegel, a moment of 
diremption, deracination or disjuncture, affective in nature, in where the self realizes 
itself as an independent, particular entity over and against which looms an alien 
externality or object from which it stands fundamentally apart. Correlatively, in 
Heidegger, Dasein is pulled from the immersion or absorption in the average 
everydayness of the das Man through a feeling of anxiety which causes a similar 
separation to institute itself between the self and its world, bringing “Dasein before its 
ownmost thrownness…reveal[ing] the uncanniness of everyday, familiar being-in-the-
world” (Heidegger, 342/327). To be ‘free’ or ‘authentic’, then, is contingent upon a 
certain kind of break with given habits, with the familiar ways of being-in-the-world. 
This reflective rupture leads the individual to cognize its own being as something with 
heft, with a genuine existence independent of how ‘one’ does things: it is, in the language 
67 
 
of Hegel, the moment of particularity where the universal immediacy of ethical substance 
is cut by the inchoate emergence of the subject, an individual person aware of its own 
desires and thoughts that may diverge from the typical way ‘one’ thinks things (in 
Malabou’s language from FH, the rupturing of Greek Subjectivity and the advent of 
Modern Subjectivity). In Heidegger, this moment of affective disjuncture inaugurates the 
possibility for seeing Dasein’s own possibility: in breaking from its entanglement in das 
Man, Dasein discloses to itself that it can think, want and potentially live differently than 
is circumscribed by the dictatorship of das Man, the way ‘one’ does things. The breaking 
of habit, the affective feeling of not-being-at-home with oneself, then, prompts a moment 
of revaluation where the self is afforded a space of minimal autonomy in which it can 
reappraise its position within the world in which it has hitherto been unreflectively 
immersed.  
The breaking of habit, however, only inaugurates the space of possibility, leading to two 
possible responses, which, in the language of Heidegger, could be designated as 
‘inauthentic’ or ‘authentic’ and, in Hegel, particular versus singular. Recognizing itself as 
a particular individual independent of ethical substance, the subject, for Hegel, initially 
responds by seeing the “laws and powers” of ethical substance as an “eternal justice, as 
gods that are in and as themselves, over against which the vain doings of individual 
humans remain merely an ever-undulating play” (PR §145). The world, ethical substance, 
the habits and ways that people do things, “relates to the subject as something that simply 
is, in the highest sense of self-sufficiency. In this respect, it is an absolute authority and 
power infinitely more stable than that of nature” (PR §146). Ethical substance, or the way 
‘one’ does things, thus confronts the self as a foreign, alien, oppressive object, an 
unmalleable stage upon which the individual merely acts: the objective world stands over 
and against the individual as something which just is, that exists independently of the 
individual’s activity and existence. This experience of alienation from the world results in 
what Hegel characterizes as the Unhappy Consciousness, a state in where the individual 
perceives itself to be changeable and unessential in contradistinction to the objective 
world which is essential and unchangeable (PS §208-9). This is the shape of 
consciousness which emerges precisely when the self no longer feels at home with the 
objective world, and the objective world comes to represent an unmalleable substance 
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which the self does not participate in the construction of but merely submits to. For 
Heidegger, this moment of diremption occurs with the affective irruption of anxiety that 
“fetches Dasein back out of its entangled absorption in the ‘world’” (Heidegger 182) 
through which “Dasein is individualized [particularized in Hegel’s language]” and 
“Being-in enters the existential ‘mode’ of not-being-at-home” (Heidegger 182-3). In the 
diremptive moment of anxiety, Dasein recognizes its own existence, in a homologous 
fashion with the Hegelian subject, as independent from das Man or ethical substance, 
becoming alienated from its habituation in its given, everyday world.  
These moments in Hegel and Heidegger are connected in that the individual affectively, 
and subsequently, reflectively, registers that it is not strictly coterminous with or 
unilaterally determined by its world. However, as both Hegel and Heidegger show, 
Dasein or the self’s initial response to this awareness of the individual’s own possibility 
results in a kind of tragic dualism as the world from which the individual is alienated 
appears as something unresponsive to the self’s needs or desires, over which it has no 
control: the world appears unchangeable, while the self can only adapt or comply with 
the given parameters prescribed by this world of das Man or the ethical substance. What 
we have, then, here, is precisely what Malabou in WB designates as flexibility: Dasein or 
the self construe themselves as only being able to receive or adapt to form, not to actively 
construct or destroy form. The objective world they inhabit appears to be a 
transcendentalized form – an externality which they can only accede and adapt to – 
instead of conceiving it as it is: a plastic form that is shaped and sculpted dialectically by 
our own activity. Here, we have moved from the universal – the passive reception of 
form through our initial habituation – to the particularization of our form where the 
universal splits into two separate moments which, while engendering the sense of an 
independent self and thus opening the possibility for the self to actively sculpt itself and 
world, subjects this emergent individual self to the ostensibly higher, external authority of 
the universal (the ostensibly unmediated, naturalized objective world). The consciousness 
of the individual is thus split between the idea of a passive individual who receives form 
and an active, external world that donates form. This conception of the relation between 
the self and world is predicated upon precisely the dualistic, metaphysical structure that 
we discussed the dangers of in chapter one: this shape of consciousness asserts a thing-in-
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itself (the objective world of das Man or ethical substance) inaccessible to human 
understanding and intervention, that which, nevertheless, still exerts influence over and 
purchase on human life. Purposefully effected, here, is the ideological occlusion of the 
true relationship between the terms of self and world, which are not antinomic, but 
speculative or dialectical: the world is not a ready-made object which exists over and 
against us, but is a plastic object which is sculpted by human activity – it is a 
phenomenon of constitutive co-habituation. Whereas the subject or Dasein is correct in 
apprehending their own being as constituted by habits, and thus being changeable, they 
fail to see the world in which they inhabit as similarly constituted by habitual – and thus 
historically emergent and contingent – ways of being. They fail to recognize that das 
Man or ethical substance, our shared socio-political and collective life, is not an 
unmalleable substance but rather a sedimentation of our own habits, a shared piece of 
marble of which we are all sculptors of and sculpted by which retains its consistency or 
shape only through our own habits or repetitive practices.  
The realm of the socio-political becomes oppressive precisely when it attempts to 
ideologically maintain this illusory metaphysic, when it promulgates its status as fixed, 
unchangeable and necessary, as, in doing so, it essentially expropriates from the 
individual the epistemic value of its affective discontent with the world. That is, when the 
subject no longer feels at home in the world, this is an affective signpost that something 
is fundamentally awry with the objective organization of the world that they inhabit: it is 
no longer hospitable, failing to provide the conditions of possibility for their freedom or 
contribute to the flourishing of their well-being. What is something potentially 
transformative – the affective recognition that something is wrong and has to change in 
the world to make one feel at home – comes to be ideologically modulated into a 
depoliticized and debilitating despair in where the subject is made to feel that there is 
nothing it can do because the shape of the world is outside of its control. What this 
dualistic metaphysic achieves in structuring the individual as changeable and the world as 
unchangeable is that it effectively pathologizes affective disjuncture as being a failure on 
the individual’s behalf to properly adapt to the world; that is, in Malabou’s words, of not 
being flexible enough. Dasein or the self is made to feel guilty, inadequate or melancholic 
because it feels out of joint with the world and assumes the affective burden of being out-
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of-order, of not working properly, as being its own personal responsibility. The self, in 
both Hegel and Heidegger, are then forced by default to retreat to the habitual ways of 
being-in-the-world and attempt to ascertain ways to make themselves at-home-again. For 
Heidegger, this is accomplished by the tranquilizing effects of immersing oneself again in 
das Man, disburdening oneself of responsibility by merely living how ‘one’ lives because 
that is the way the world ‘is’ – one lives inauthentically, but comfortably in the constant 
suppression of one’s affective discomfort. For Hegel, one simply succumbs and “die[s] 
from habituation” becoming “wholly habituated to their lives…dully spiritually and 
physically” letting all “activity and vitality disappear” resulting in “spiritual or physical 
death” (PR §151). By foreclosing any possibility of genuinely imagining another way of 
life, of erasing the notion of an actual future, and forcing the subject to merely live and 
act the same, this dualistic metaphysic, if it pervades and entrenches itself in 
consciousness, essentially subsidizes the individual’s subjection and disaffection; one can 
say, following Hegel, that we are, in fact, spurred to our own death: to be coerced into 
living in habits after they have affectively abandoned us, when spirit flees, is tantamount 
to goading our own suicide. Returning to the usual course of things, even when one has 
become disaffiliated, is to contribute to the further recalcitrance of the shape of life that 
produced the self’s discontent in the first place. An outcome which, important for today, 
is favorable to the few, but hardly to the many.  
 
 
2.4 Habit in the Active Sculpting of Self and World: Putting 
Plasticity to Work 
 
The moment of singularity, in Hegel’s terms, or authenticity in Heidegger, would be to 
grasp the mutually constitutive relation between the individual and its world and assume 
– take over, appropriate, make one’s own – the responsibility the individual has over 
deciding how it seeks to actualize its possibility for sculpting its world and own life. 
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While the affective disjuncture can provoke the response just detailed, it also opens up 
the space for a positive and transformative appropriation of this moment of being not-at-
home. What opens this space, for each of Hegel, Heidegger and Malabou, is, through the 
epistemic affective rupture with the world, the recognition or coming to consciousness of 
one’s own inherent capacity for, what are essentially made interchangeable terms by 
Malabou, respectively, negativity (in Hegel), possibility (in Heidegger) and plasticity (in 
Malabou): which is to say, the coming to consciousness of one’s capacity for becoming 
different, becoming otherwise because of the essential plasticity of one’s own existence. 
Any potential transformative, emancipatory activity, for each thinker, is conditional upon 
the realization of these two interconnected points: the immanent, reciprocal constitution 
of the self and the world and, most crucially, the fundamental plasticity of being, that is, 
the possibility to change and give form to yourself and the world. This is pointedly stated 
by Hegel when he says that governing purpose of life is to immanently realize the 
concept of freedom “in…externally objective aspects, making the latter a world moulded 
by the former, which in it is thus at home with itself, locked together with it…” (Hegel, 
PM §484). That is, the point of our existence is to make the objective world one we want 
to live in through our own concerted subjective activity. The reason this is possible, for 
Hegel, is because the subject and its world are initially a ‘second nature’, thrown in their 
being, and thus is, in a sense groundless. This groundlessness provides the subject with 
an inherent capacity for negativity: its fundamental contingency permits it to negate any 
‘thrown’ or actualized determinations because, at heart, the self is pure possibility. In 
Heidegger, Dasein must take up this knowledge, its truth as being-possible, and act with 
fidelity to the contingency of its being to take over its life as its own and no one else’s. 
With Malabou, she similarly calls for an acting in accordance with the ‘truth’ of one’s 
being, which is, one’s plasticity, the possibility of form to change. The problem here, as 
stated in the beginning of this chapter, is how to put this plasticity or possibility of the 
subject to self-determine the shape of its own life and world to work. The announcement 
of a need to become aware of our plasticity, our possibility to become otherwise, the 
abgrund of our being, is not new. As we have just seen, and probably are well aware, 
these ideas are central elements to any nominally emancipatory critical enterprise since, I 
argue, Hegel, but certainly since Marx. One receives form from the world and ineluctably 
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bestows it in turn: one either conforms to the preexisting habitus and thereby maintains 
its hegemony or breaks from one’s habitus and reforms it through pursuing other ways of 
being that transform it at a structural level; if one exists one is shaping – consciously or 
unconsciously – the materiality of oneself, the social, the earth. The world is an 
immanent structure that is sculpted by human activity and praxis: here, Malabou exhibits 
a clear affinity and continuity with Marx. However, initially and for the most part, as 
Heidegger and Hegel show, one typically only deepens the cut of habitual contours in or 
of the world instead of forging new ones. Ostensibly, this is because we are not conscious 
of our plasticity, of the possibility that everything could be different and that we 
ourselves can instantiate this change. If only we could summon a consciousness of 
plasticity – the fact that being is intrinsically capable of the reception, donation and 
annihilation of form without privileging any given valence – than perhaps things would 
be different. Realizing the plastic materiality that constitutes the being of ourselves and 
world may mean we are afforded the promissory comfort of knowing things could be 
different, or as Malabou puts it, that there is always another possibility as being is plastic 
and hence constitutively open to change. But, while this valence is stirring, and 
admittedly needs to be preserved, if construed strictly in this sense the announcement of 
the plasticity of being, the brain, the self, our world amounts to little more than a 
palliative, a mantra coincident with the de facto anthem of the Left writ large: things can 
be otherwise or different, as if recognizing that things can be different is a good or end in 
itself. What good is possibility, or the virtuality of difference, if it never actualizes itself?  
Coming to feel at-home-with-oneself and the world again can only be achieved through 
the work of habit, of reshaping those habits or ways of being inherited from das Man or 
ethical substance which initially formed you; as Malabou writes in FH, “[t]he route to 
recovery is the work of habit” (36). If we feel alienated from the world – not-at-home - 
the only way to rectify this affective disjuncture is engaging in the construction of new 
habits by transforming that which makes you feel disaffiliated: re-appropriating the 
world, making it one’s ‘own’ again, by changing it. Like any therapeutic enterprise, 
however, the cultivation of new habits – and the withering of old ones – is a trying and 
difficult task. Returning to the ontological vision of plasticity outlined in the first chapter, 
we live in an immanent structure with no exteriority: it is merely a densely imbricated 
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network of finite materialities that can form, be formed and perish – like the interaction 
of neurons and synapses in the functioning of the brain. Matter, for Malabou, functions in 
the same way that neuronal connections do: pathways, forms or networks – analogically 
representing here structures and ways of being – are created and gain in strength with 
repetition and increased synaptic efficacy (long-term potentiation) and others are 
diminished or reduced with stimulation (long-term depreciation) leading to cell death 
(Malabou, WB 22-5). That is, simply, the shape and complexion of our brain – 
analogically, our shared collective mind or social structures – is either sedimented or 
transformed depending solely on how we act and what we do: in this way, “man (sic) is 
only what he does and only expresses what he forms” (Malabou, FH 68). And, these new 
connections, these habits, are only inculcated and ingrained or come to be through 
repetition, practice and commitment: the plasticity of forms – whether they be the self or 
the social – have a tendency to congeal, fortify or stabilize when particular activities are 
employed more frequently or habitually. Here, the claustrophobia of Malabou’s 
ontological vision emerges again: we are only what we do. There is a definitive 
“impossibility of fleeing” (Malabou, PDW 65; emphasis mine): the frontiers of being are 
inescapable, there is nowhere else to go. In this phrase, Malabou implicitly condemns and 
explicitly positions herself against the much vaunted Deleuze-Guatarrian notion of the 
line of flight as the means of emancipation from ways of being that have become 
unmalleable and oppressive. We all feel this impulse to flee “when an extreme tension, a 
pain, a sensation of uneasiness surges toward an outside that does exist” (Malabou, PDW 
65) – that is, when we no longer feel at home in the world and require new ways of being 
when the existing situation no longer serves our interests or well-being. “It is not”, then, 
“a question of how to escape closure but rather of how to escape within closure itself” 
(Malabou, PDW 65) – “the ‘way out’ is achieved by an upheaval within daily life itself” 
(Malabou, PDW 70). One can virtually flee the present, but as long as this is strictly 
delimited to a move of de-territorialization, the reason that one feels this “tension” or 
“pain” remains firmly intact: the objective socio-political world as it currently stands. 
One must, to relieve this existential discomfort, determinately endeavour to change the 
contours of the structure or dominant situation itself. To be ‘subversive’ or ‘disruptive’ 
by small flashes of negation does nothing to dislodge the hegemony of the habitual 
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world. This is the essential problem with micropolitical thinkers of a Deleuzian ilk (for 
instance, William Connolly and Jane Bennett). While being attentive to the nature of 
habits, understanding that they are difficult to form, that they take time, effort and 
coordination, their political prescriptions of lines of flight or guerilla style tactics of 
defamiliarization are incommensurate to what they are trying to achieve: the 
recomposition of territories or habits of being. However, rhizomes surge up and then 
dissipate just as quickly as they came. These insurgencies into the ossified form of the 
world need to be vigilantly maintained through practice, repetition, and commitment to 
have any true efficacy whatsoever. That is, the flash of virtuality is only that: it 
deracinates you from your immersion in the given, providing one with a minimal space of 
autonomy through which difference can be enacted (or through which a preindividual 
field of singularities can actualize through you). Reading the line of flight through 
Malabou’s sculptural analogy demonstrates its inadequacy to actually transforming the 
real: if the form of the world is equivalent to marble, appearing as an implacable and 
unmalleable substance, uncoordinated and aleatory deterritorializations are equivalent to 
small strikes of a chisel which would be ineffective in hewing out a new contour or shape 
of the sculpture – the primary features of the structure remain intact.  
The impasse of espousing a micropolitics that eschews any designs of self-determined 
‘re-territorializing’ is that one is consigned to merely, as Adrian Johnston describes it, 
“nudging and tinkering with one’s selfhood” (Johnston 170) in the experimentation with 
different lifestyles, habits and modes of being without any substantial engagement or 
investment in the rearrangement of the socio-political. However, while certainly 
imperfect, a prescription of micropolitical ‘nudging and tinkerings’ – an attentive 
modulation of habits or techniques of the self – should not itself be the target of criticism, 
but, rather, the focus should be more squarely placed on the failure or refusal of these 
micropolitical positions to situate a focus on habits of the self within a horizon of 
coordinated macropolitical ends. That is, there is a tendency in broadly construed 
micropolitical leftist thought to be allergic to anything that resembles a centralized 
organization, a common goal or coordinated objectives, as this would resemble 
something like the ‘state’ which is an apparatus of capture that stratifies the flows of 
becoming, the ‘vital’ energy that is being. Any organization or coordination of forces 
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becomes quickly territorialized and, hence, non-emancipatory because the singular 
desires of those involved congeal, slow down, or are effectively compromised. The 
orientation of such a nominally political project, here, then, is to ensure that one always 
escapes any mediation, anything that would compromise its virtual purity of movement. 
In this sense, any Deleuzian inspired thinking of emancipatory change, as Peter Hallward 
observes, is “essentially indifferent to the politics of this world” (162) as one of the 
animating thrusts of Deleuze’s thought is to be, precisely, as the name of Hallward’s 
book on Deleuze suggests, out of this world: Deleuze’s thought does not seek to change 
the world, or make it its own, but only insure that it does not get captured by it. The 
image of escape marshaled in Deleuzian thought is thus a permutation of what Malabou 
designates, as elaborated in chapter one, as a fetishization of an outside: the positing of a 
chimerical excess which eludes, and ostensibly frustrates or disrupts, the economy or 
closed structure of being.  Yet, as Malabou urgently insists, one is always already caught 
up in the world: there is no outside, there is no “way out”, there is nowhere else one could 
exist – there is an impossibility of fleeing. The turn to the micropolitical, in this instance 
then, ends up being an insular quietism in the guise of radical subversion and openness to 
the world that does nothing to change the status quo, but only seeks to preserve its own 
purity in the face of contamination by the ‘corrupted’ world of actuality. The logic here, 
of preserving the potential or virtuality of the self as a higher good than that of 
actualizing oneself in the world, uncannily resembles that of a staunch libertarian who 
demands the right to negative freedom above all else. However, even though one 
ostensibly abstains from the given, objective world, one still negatively supports the 
existence of that world through one’s subtraction. In pursuing a bad infinity of constant, 
minor lines of flight and brief habits, the micropolitics of Deleuze does nothing to 
actually efficaciously change the way that the world is being sculpted but actually 
contributes to the maintenance of the given present in pursuing its fantasy of a possibility 
of being ‘else-where’, out of the world. Analogically, if one’s ship is sinking, and filling 
with water, you may be best not to insist on trying to find pockets of remaining space in 
the rising water, flitting from one temporary reprieve to another, but actually endeavour 
to fix the sundered hull.  
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Micropolitics – if untethered from a macropolitical horizon and relegated to the private 
pursuit of a techniques of the self – are essentially politically inefficacious and even 
detrimental to emancipatory change and the accomplishment of instating new ways of 
being-in-the-world. However, the tendency to antinomically pit a “reformist 
micropolitics” versus a “revolutionary macropolitics” as a response, is, I argue, equally 
inadmissible and depoliticizing (Johnston 158). The thinkers with whom Malabou is most 
frequently associated are Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek and Adrian Johnston35 who all share 
an aversion to the micropolitical turn and exhort a return to the macropolitical in the form 
of a renewed dialectical materialism that is actualized through a reading of German 
Idealism (primarily Hegel) through Marx and Jacques Lacan. They vehemently reject the 
political import of any kind of micropolitical stance, citing that it has become the de facto 
ideological position that has mired the contemporary left in its own impotent deadlock of 
counselling endless small-scale, local practices that ostensibly exist outside and resist 
capitalism, but which really only further buttress it while providing the ethical palliative 
that one is ‘doing’ something. The broad anti-institutionalism that characterizes 
contemporary leftist thinking, born of Deleuze and Guatarri, has effectively led to the 
refutation, as argued above, of any willingness to cultivate a properly leftist hegemony 
which, a view that Badiou, Žižek, Johnston broadly share, following a Marxian line of 
thinking political resistance, is crucial to mounting an efficacious form of contesting and 
moving beyond ossified and oppressive socio-political situations, i.e. contemporary 
capitalism. However, while correct in emphasizing the need to attend to committed and 
organized macropolitical habitual change, in the blunt dismissal of the micropolitical this 
                                                 
35
 See for instance this characterization: “Materialist accounts of subjectivity, or transcendental 
materialism, are a sensibility first articulated by Adrian Johnston in his systematic reading of the work of 
Slavoj Žižek, which can equally describe aspects of the projects of figures such as Alain Badiou [and] 
Catherine Malabou…Transcendental Materialism can best be described as a set of basic philosophical 
principles shared by a group of contemporary figures. The first commonality shared by those whose work 
could be considered Transcendental Materialism (hereafter TM) is a shared set of references that include 
German Idealism, Lacanian Psychoanalysis, and Marxist Materialism. One can find this triad in the work of 
Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou, Catherine Malabou, Adrian Johnston…It could be said that each of these 
thinkers begins with an axiom of Marxist, or Dialectical, Materialism and then uses this axiom of 
Materialism to re-consider both German Idealism and Psychoanalysis, a method of interpretation most 
explicit in the works of Žižek…” (Burns and Smith 1, 3). Johnston also posits an explicit line of thought 
from “Hegel and Marx through Žižek and Malabou…” (174).  
77 
 
“revolutionary macropolitical” thinking is subtended and plagued by its own fantasies 
and problems. In dismissing gradual reformism because it both leads to a political 
quietism of perpetually delaying actual, revolutionary change, thus only further 
contributing to the maintenance of the status quo, this ‘big’ thinking relies upon the 
advocacy of a grand, ruptural break with the given order that would then open up the 
space for a re-organization of one’s socio-political situation (the representation of such 
thinking is found most notably in Badiou’s well-known theory of the Event). Yet, 
conceptualizing political transformation through a singular or exceptional Event leads to 
its own kind of quietism in where one similarly waits for an authentic or true break to 
occur in one’s situation that would permit its re-composition – it to, then, exhibits the 
traces of the messianic Malabou so harshly and persuasively criticizes as being 
fundamentally unpolitical. In the refutation of micropolitical habitual change, this evental 
thinking of revolution requires a subject who, somehow, alchemizes into a committed 
insurrectionist at precisely the same time in unison with a whole collectivity of people 
who are unified by the same goals and ends of effectively implementing socio-political 
change. The ‘revolutionary macropolitical’ disconnected from any ‘reformist 
micropolitics’ relies upon a faint romantic religiosity of an immaculate conversion that 
would create a political subject ex nihilio. Attendant to this, the ‘macropolitical’ event – 
again, untethered from ‘micropolitical’ praxis – relies upon a notion that one irruptive 
break into the marble of the world would be enough to instantiate a sustained difference 
or actual new shape of being-in-the-world. Again, Malabou’s sculptural analogy here 
demonstrates the limits of the Event, as, in the analogy, the Event would register as one 
violent cut into the marble. While serving the purpose of erasing the former shape of the 
statue, it does not provide a determinate new one.  
While Malabou is grouped with these Neo-Hegelian thinkers, her thought, in regards to 
political transformation, does not coincide with their prescriptions for political practice or 
subjectivity. For all of Žižek and Johnston’s touting of their radically faithful 
Hegelianism, it is actually Malabou’s thought that remains closest in fidelity to what 
Hegel actually says about socio-political transformation. Hegel writes in PR:  
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A people cannot change the entire consciousness of spirit at once, as would 
happen through the utter destruction of the constitution…Through the form of 
education [Bildung], there comes to be a peaceful alteration, a shedding of the old 
skin and a rejuvenation… (§275) 
Here, the proximity of Hegel’s observation of change being a ‘shedding of the old skin’ 
through a graduated process of education and Malabou’s thinking concerning the 
sculpting of one’s plastic being through a process of habit (itself intimately tied with 
Bildung) is patent. Indeed, Hegel writes that Bildung:  
is the art of making human beings ethical36. It considers them as natural and 
shows how they can be born again, how their first nature can be transformed into 
a second spiritual one so that what is spiritual within them becomes habitual” (PR 
§151; emphasis mine).  
To unpack, the point here is that when the subject is thrown into the world, as we have 
seen through our reading of Hegel and Heidegger, they are completely at one with it. 
With the emergence of their own particularity – the cognizance of themselves as a self 
that is not wholly contiguous with their world – the subject then can deracinate from the 
doxa of the given and reflectively and critically evaluate the world that it has been thrown 
into: one realizes oneself as spirit or self-determining subjectivity, that one and one’s 
world is one what does or creates in concert with a community of others; one is not 
merely a subject to the world, but subjectively participates in the construction of one’s 
world through one’s own activity. This point of deracination occurs “when spirit 
progresses as itself and the institutions do not alter along with the evolving spirit” and, 
when this happens, “true dissatisfaction arises” (PR §274). This “true dissatisfaction” is 
the affective disjuncture described earlier, the not-feeling-at-home of the self when spirit 
realizes the shape of the world does not accord with its own. Here, as we recall, spirit can 
                                                 
36
 The term ‘ethical’ in Hegel’s PR is the third moment in the development of the socio-political subject. It 
is the moment which combines in itself the universality of abstract right and the particularity of morality. 
When the subject has sublated these two moments into its consciousness, it can participate fully in ethical 
life: the realization that it is produced by and produces the objective world in which it inhabits.  
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die from its habituation (§ 151) – when the world no longer contributes to the flourishing 
of its well-being or provide the objective conditions through which its freedom can be 
best actualized – if one merely accedes or acquiesces to the given as an unmalleable 
substance. However, spirit, as a reflective, self-determining consciousness or subject, can 
be born again – that is, transformed because it is fundamentally plastic – by making the 
shape of the world conform to its own being and once again reawaken its own vital 
energy and possibility. If spirit merely replicates the caricature of the world – that is, 
remains flexible and adaptive instead of seizing its own plasticity and actively 
constructing itself – it is doomed to be forever dissatisfied, becoming spiritually dull, 
disaffected, disaffiliated. Here, Hegel unexpectedly coincides with Spinoza and Deleuze 
in regards to the fundamentally political nature of affects. An apathetic subject – without 
desire, without the possibility to imagine a different future for itself – is, as Malabou 
argues reading Spinoza and Deleuze, necessary for the political exercise of power: 
“Sadness…involves the diminishment of my power in acting. Deleuze [reading Spinoza] 
shows that the duality between sadness and joy is being played by political power and 
power needs us to be sad in order to reduce our capacity to act and resist” (Malabou 
“From Sorrow to Indifference”). Here, the singularity of Malabou’s position in 
contradistinction to both Deleuzian micropolitics and Neo-Hegelian macropolitics can be 
put into relief. As we have just seen, Hegel, Heidegger and Malabou agree fundamentally 
with Deleuze and Spinoza that one of the primary ways that political formations maintain 
their governance is through the regulation of affect, which is the purview of 
micropolitics. The regulation of affect is achieved through modulating subjectivity vis-à-
vis habits of everyday life. The problem with the micropolitics as conceived through 
Deleuze is that habits are meant to be broken, eluded and spurned not reinstantiated or 
reforged: the world is not to be re-appropriated or created by the subject, but is 
fundamentally hostile to the well-being or freedom of the subject and is thus only to be 
escaped through lines of flight. Thus, following Hegel and Malabou, the micropolitical 
subject, construed in this fashion, is consigned to disaffection because it does not treat the 
actual source of the problem: the lack of being-at-home at world that is achieved through 
the cultivation and creation of social habits. They misidentify the world as an intrinsic 
mechanism of capture – something that is a priori oppressive - instead of a plastic 
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creation that we ourselves makes which should fundamentally be a place which is 
hospitable to the subjects that inhabit it. The Neo-Hegelian macropolitical perspective 
offers a corrective to this by rightly identifying that what is required is a larger scale 
reorientation of socio-political habits and not merely the atomized rebellion of 
uncoordinated personal practices that seek to merely preserve their own negative 
freedom. What the macropolitical derision of the micropolitical fails to countenance, 
however, in its overzealous but understandable emphasis on the need to ‘think big’ or 
cognize larger-scale socio-political change, is that cultivation of new habits of life is 
contingent upon the daily, micropolitical practices of engaged and committed subjects 
who only become as such, not through a miraculous conversion, but through a graduated 
transformation, ‘a shedding of the old skin’, a process of patient and committed sculpting 
– i.e. through micropolitical habit formation – and not the alchemy of a messianic Event. 
To articulate this distinction in terms of Malabou’s thinking of plasticity: Deleuzian 
micropolitics fails to see the objective world as plastic, instead operating under the 
auspices of flexibility, treating the world as an unmalleable substance that is a priori 
anathema to the freedom and becoming of the individual and responds by attempting to 
escape, assuming positions or ‘lines of flight’ that are – illusorily – ‘external’ to or out of 
the world. Such fleeing, is, however, as Malabou argues, impossible, and thus this 
ostensible subversion leads contradictorily to only a rebuttressing of the present and 
further contributes to the self’s own disaffection as the source of the problem remains 
untreated: the problem is not the habits of the world, but the present instantiation of them. 
The macropolitical revolutionary perspective – touted under the name of Hegel and 
dialectical materialism – rightly recognizes the plasticity of being and social habits, but 
mistakenly vitiates the very means of realizing these changes in its derision of the 
micropolitical. That is, the transformation of large scale socio-political habits are always 
subtended by the reorientation and construction of new habits of being in the lives of 
individuals who realize and come to believe, have faith in, that they themselves can 
change. It is unproductive to shame people into thinking that they cannot make any kind 
of real change in the ‘everyday’ – that the only true change or politics is a revolutionary 
outburst or the ‘to come’ of an Event. Rather, as Malabou writes, “authenticity is only a 
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modified, transformed grasp of existence. There is no change of ground. The ‘way out’ is 
achieved by an upheaval within daily existence itself” (PDW 70).  
 These two moments or conceptions of what constitutes a politically meaningful  
materialism must be dialectically thought together, something, which, I argue, Malabou’s 
conception of plasticity read in conjunction with habit may provide. Malabou’s thinking 
situates itself in between these two extremes by being attentive to the necessity of 
actually engaging and constructing the world – as opposed to merely fleeing it – as well 
as recognizing the impossibility of thinking transformation without a micropolitical 
aspect. Drawing from her discussions of the brain, the materiality of our world is shaped 
through the habits of which it is composed: it is comprised only of the actions which we 
repeatedly practice, which we cut into the marble of existence. Because this materiality is 
fundamentally plastic, however, this means that it can always be transformed or re-
sculpted. Changing the shape or form of our own life and world, however, is not only 
contingent upon becoming conscious of plasticity, our ability for formation and 
reformation, but is wholly dependent on actually put this plasticity to work. What 
Malabou’s thinking of plasticity shows us is that we are always already sculpted and 
always already sculpting ourselves and our world. In existing, we are already being given 
shape and giving shape to the world that we inhabit. Realizing one’s plasticity, and the 
plasticity which is being qua being, entails recognizing that we participate in this process 
and, not only that, we are only this process. One is only what one does: there is no 
‘outside’, no reprieve, one is always on this speculative existential clock with their chisel 
in hand. This means, as Malabou writes, “that we can sometimes decide about the 
future…which means that there is actually something to do with it” (PDW 77). As the 
qualification ‘sometimes’ indicates, this position is always a precarious one. There are no 
guarantees that we will succeed in our attempts to self-determinately shape the world in 
which we live – as Malabou’s cruel reading of plasticity entails, one only has the 
possibility to change – you could very well not succeed – and one is faced with a myriad 
of other forms pushing back against you in resistance. Yet, the strongest possibility to 
achieve the shape or form of life that we want is through the work of habit which means 
beyond its familiar, passive sense, the strenuous throwing oneself into repetition, 
commitment, fidelity; taking the marble of the world, knowing that it can be changed, no 
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matter the resistance it displays, and keep chiseling, hewing, hammering, trying until 
something finally gives way and you forget why it was ever difficult in the first place, 
that is, until it becomes a habit. The element of habit that seems to always be forgotten is 
its intrinsically purposeful or voluntarist aspect: it takes effort to create effortlessness, it 
takes the experience of the unfamiliar to create the familiar. Habit always entails an 
exposure of oneself to the unknown, an ekstasis or a throwing of oneself out of oneself. 
The importance of re-appraising habit as a meaningful ethico-political resource is that it 
puts the possibility of change back into the hands of people in the everyday and implies 
constant engagement. Discourse around what constitutes politics proper often oscillates 
between extremes of radical voluntarism or defeatist reformism. Faced with an either/or 
mandate, one must imagine a third alternative. The attempt to think a mutual plastic 
sculpting of self and world through habit is such an attempt. Realizing one is always in 
the process of both giving and receiving form from the world, being sculpted and 
sculpting, would entail recognizing that we are not consigned to the contours of the 
thinkable prescribed by the situation or the habitus and seizing this possibility that 
inheres in each of us for actual, material change. Habit is the conduit through which this 
change is achieved: habit because change does not happen overnight, change does not 
happen easily and it only ever happens, solely, through our own effort. It takes fidelity, 
commitment and repetition; it is a Decision, a leap of faith, a pure vulnerability to the 
future. Habit is never cynical – it cannot be or it has already failed. We must recognize 
the emancipatory potential of habit and believe it so that we begin to live differently, so 
that we begin to extricate ourselves from the injunctions of the situation, so that we see 
what has been made unthinkable; through our practice of an otherwise, the otherwise 
becomes thinkable, changing the co-ordinates of the ‘possible’, of the given. The shape of 
the world to come is here now, and now, and now. You are, we are, together, sculpting it.    
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Conclusion 
 
There is nothing degrading in being alive, and there is no higher spirituality 
within which one could have worldly being. It is only the raising of the given to 
something self-created that yields the higher orbit of the good… – G.W.F. Hegel, 
Philosophy of Right §123 
The ignominy of possibilities of life that we are offered appears from within. We 
do not feel ourselves outside of our time but continue to undergo shameful 
compromises with it. This feeling of shame is one of philosophy’s most powerful 
motifs…We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of 
concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet 
exist – Gilles Deleuze, What is Philosophy? 108 
What we are lacking is life, which is to say: resistance. Resistance is what we 
want. Resistance to flexibility…I have tried to position us at the heart of this 
challenge, while inviting readers to do what they undoubtedly have never done: 
construct and entertain a relation with their brain as the image of a world to come 
– Catherine Malabou, WB 68, 82 
To return to where we began, let me again reiterate the formulation of plasticity in 
Malabou’s thinking. As we have seen, for Malabou the materiality – the marble that is 
existence – comprising our world is defined by its ontological plasticity: the originary 
passing into presence or mutability of being (mutability is primordial to presence), it is 
the simple capacity to give, receive and annihilate form. Malabou’s critical move is the 
sublation of traditionally conceived properties of transcendence – activity, agency, 
construction, openness, freedom – into conventionally understood deterministic forms: 
structure, system and immanent materiality itself. In essentially immanentizing 
transcendence as an internal property of matter itself through plasticity, Malabou 
responds to the necessity of elaborating a form of materialism that compellingly moves 
beyond the customary impasses of mechanism, determinism and reductionism. The 
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universalization of plasticity as the definitive nature of matter or being qua being is 
Malabou’s attempt to coherently establish a feasible ontology of materiality which 
accounts for the possibility for material subjects immanent to this closed economy of 
Being to exhibit the capacity for self-determination or for self-directed change; that is, the 
genuine possibility of a future and not a fate. Plasticity is, as Malabou writes, the 
possibility to envisage a ‘way out’ when “there is no outside, no ‘elsewhere’” (PDW 65), 
when there appears an absolute ‘impossibility of fleeing’. This ‘impossibility of fleeing’, 
at an ontological level, “means first of all the impossibility of fleeing oneself” (PDW 81). 
Where existence presses upon us with seemingly unbearable weight, we do feel the urge 
to escape. However, no such escape, traditionally conceived, is possible. What plasticity 
provides is a way of conceptualizing a becoming-different right at the level of form or 
life itself; it is a way of escaping closure within the absolute closure of the world.  
The main caveat with Malabou’s philosophical demonstration of plasticity, as I have 
argued, is that, theoretically, followed to the logical end of her own elaboration of the 
concept, plasticity amounts to only possibility. It does not guarantee anything, but shows 
one only an open door for becoming otherwise. The importance of such a defense of 
possibility should not, however, be cynically looked askance. Arguably, such invocations 
of possibility, of genuine hope, should be, as Malabou writes, sheltered, protected and 
defended (FH 193). Indeed, one could argue that what is needed most of all today is the 
development of means of cultivating and then mobilizing the libidinal or affective desire 
that undergirds and accompanies such a notion as possibility. That is, we should no 
longer cynically distance ourselves from being attached to, invested in and believing that 
the world can and should be different, and that we have the capacity to enact such a 
change. The singularity of Malabou’s articulation of possibility vis-à-vis plasticity is that 
it grounds this possibility in the materiality of Being itself: it is no longer merely the 
purview of the ephemeral ‘transcendent’ character of the subject, but inscribed right at 
the heart of the neurological or material-ontological bases of the human itself. In a way, 
Malabou’s non-reductionist, dialectically informed reading of plasticity and 
neuroplasticity of the brain is a contemporary vindication of figures like Hegel, Marx, 
and Sartre: it epistemologically validates that, yes, we are, in fact, our own constructions. 
We make our own history, we are own our projects, we are our own sculptures.  
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Critical to realizing our plasticity, to cognizing that we our own history, our own projects 
and sculptures, is, indeed, for Malabou, affective in nature, entailing that “we…relearn 
how to enrage ourselves, to explode against a certain culture of docility, of amenity, of 
the effacement of all conflict…” (Malabou, WB 79). For Malabou, the question of ‘what 
should we do with our brain?’ 
is above all to visualize the possibility of saying no to an afflicting economic, 
political, and mediatic culture that celebrates only the triumph of flexibility, 
blessing obedient individuals who have no greater merit than that of knowing how 
to bow their heads with a smile (WB 79) 
With Malabou’s emphasis on the contemporary political importance of affect, one of the 
future potentials for research is situating her work within a larger conversation occurring 
among thinkers such as Bernard Stiegler, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Johnathan Crary and 
Jodi Dean, who all, in their own way, try to think the manifolds ways in which the 
contemporary subject is a political site of affective regulation. That is, how do 
contemporary habits in mediatic capitalism serve to inculcate an affective apathy and 
resignation, a late capitalist anhedonia, and neutralize this ‘rage’ or desire for resistance 
that Malabou identifies as being critical to emancipatory projects. Another way we could 
frame this is, how do current habits in our mediatic culture dull or seek to nullify the 
positive, proactive response to feeling ‘not-being-at-home’? How do we explain the 
current implosion of anxiety, depression and other affective “disorders” and the 
subsequent atomistic pathologization of these conditions to strictly personal, 
neurochemical imbalances? Does Malabou’s thinking of dialectical neuroplasticity – the 
inextricability of the self and world – provide a way to rectify the atomism of the 
neurochemical pharmaceutical industry by forcing us to countenance how many of the 
anxieties that individuals suffer, while being neurochemical, are perhaps connected to 
societal factors that are ultimately within our control to assuage, i.e. work precarity? How 
much of the pervasiveness of anxiety is actually a heuristic which evinces that people are 
fundamentally unhappy with the world, and much more anxiety or affective suffering is 
caused by institutions attributing this problem to the individual rather than the world? 
This, of course, connects back to one of Malabou’s primary points about the habit of 
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ontological dualism that subtends our dominant ways of interpreting the world: the world 
is preserved as right, true and unchangeable, and the individual is the one who is wrong, 
askew, or ‘out of order’, who fails to have the appropriate ‘skills’ or ‘neurological 
makeup’ to properly adapt. Malabou’s thinking of plasticity and affect, in concert with 
these previously named thinkers, have much to contribute to the demystification of these 
present, damaging truisms.  
A second major line of research that should be noted, which is latent but not fully explicit 
in this thesis, is the relationship of Malabou to the thought of Deleuze. There is important 
work to be done in determining both the relationship between and Malabou’s 
indebtedness to Deleuze’s thought. Indeed, it is my own position that Malabou’s Hegel is 
one that is read through Deleuze. If one of Malabou’s primary motivating questions is 
what form of Hegel and Heidegger can exist beyond their deconstruction, another 
question that implicitly animates her thought – one that is not explicitly addressed yet by 
her – is, simultaneously, what form of Hegel can exist beyond and after Deleuze? 
Malabou’s development of plasticity may be seen as a response to this question, a 
question any endorsement of Hegel after Deleuze must answer. Indeed, it seems radically 
anti-Hegelian to not countenance the fact of the emergence of Deleuze’s thought in 
history or to simply ascribe it to something that Hegel himself could see coming – this 
tactic that marks some defenses of Hegel (Slavoj iek’s Organs Without Bodies is here 
emblematic) contravenes Hegel’s own avowed belief in the historicity of thought itself 
and the necessity of thought to respond to its own historical circumstances. That is, 
Deleuze himself, if you are a Hegelian, is a movement of the absolute. If thinking is 
attempting to grasp itself in its own times, anyone who truly follows Hegel’s assertion of 
the historicity of thought must grapple with the fact that Deleuze’s thought both emerged 
and took such affective hold: why is Spirit so drawn to the image of thought propounded 
by Deleuze? To treat everything after Hegel as a sterile repetition of Hegelian thought is 
to unwittingly confirm those accusations of Hegel as the ‘end of history’ or that he 
himself was the apotheosis of absolute knowledge. This is to say, is it not possible that it 
is actually more faithful to Hegelian thought to concede that Hegel himself must be 
sublated? And, if so, has Malabou essentially covertly done that? 
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Whatever the particular differences that exist between Deleuze, Malabou and Hegel, the 
epigraphs I have adduced at the beginning of this conclusion point towards both shared 
convictions and ambivalences about the fraught position we often find ourselves in 
relation to our world. Recognizing the world’s asymmetry with how we would actually 
like to see it, we feel a sense of shame, a feeling of defeat, a lack of life. That is, the 
fundamental affective disjuncture of not-being-at-home. Each of Hegel, Deleuze and 
Malabou identify that what rectifies this feeling of shame, lifelessness or not-being-at-
home is the construction of something which is of our own doing. As Deleuze writes, 
“[w]e lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in itself 
calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist” (What is 
Philosophy 108). Malabou, writing in WB, echoes Deleuze precisely: “[w]hat we are 
lacking is life, which is to say: resistance. Resistance is what we want. Resistance to 
flexibility…” (68). We only feel this lack of life, this want of resistance, this shame, 
because there exists the possibility of ourselves and world being or becoming different. 
When Malabou writes, then, that what we should do with our brain is not replicate the 
caricature of the world, she means that the only way to assuage this feeling of a lack of 
life, a feeling of shame, is to act in fidelity to one’s plasticity and consciously attend to 
the construction of one’s self and world not merely acquiesce to the given as, Hegel 
writes, “[i]t is only [in] the raising of the given to something self-created that yields the 
higher orbit of the good” (PR §123). Putting this plasticity or possibility to work, 
however, as we have seen, is only accomplished through the work of habit: of making the 
estranged world one that coincides again with one’s spirit, as best one can. Only by 
consciously sculpting the plastic potential of our selves and world through the concerted 
action of habit will we be able to efficaciously embody this want of resistance, 
constructing a new shape of the world in which we can be at home again.  
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